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1. Introduction 
Survival or event history analysis is the umbrella term for the set of statistical tools that are 
used to answer questions related to timing and the occurrence of an event of interest. It has 
traditionally been applied in the field of medical research where duration until death or 
duration until appearance or reappearance of a disease is usually the event of interest, hence 
the name Survival Analysis. Survival analysis has been prominently applied in other 
disciplines such as engineering (known as reliability theory), economics (known as duration 
analysis or duration modelling), sociology (known as event history analysis), and political 
science. The variable of primary interest in survival analysis is the time to an event, which in 
our application is the incorporation of a firm to bankruptcy filing or some other financial 
distress event. A firm is said to be at risk of the event (bankruptcy/financial distress) after the 
initial event (i.e. incorporation) has taken place. Alternatively, the response variable can be 
viewed as the duration of time that a firm spent in a healthy state before transition to a 
bankruptcy state occurs. Survival analysis demands special methods primarily due to right-
censoring, where the time to the occurrence of an event is unknown for some subjects 
because the event of interest has not taken place by the end of the sampling or observation 
period. These statistical models examine the hazard rate, which is defined as the conditional 
probability that an event of interest occurs within a given time interval.  
The growing popularity of the use of hazard models to predict corporate failure has 
motivated us to undertake this empirical study. Since the seminal work of Shumway (2001), 
the use of the hazard rate modelling technique has become a popular methodology in 
bankruptcy prediction studies (see among others Chava and Jarrow 2004; Campbell et al. 
2008; Gupta et al. 2014). However, this growing popularity of hazard models in bankruptcy 
prediction seems to be trend or momentum driven, rather than based on a strong theoretical 
underpinning. Although the superiority of hazard models in predicting binary outcomes is 
well documented in the literature (see among others Beck et al. 1998; Shumway 2001; 
Allison 2014), its recent use in predicting corporate failure does not appropriately 
acknowledge fundamental concerns associated with survival analysis. This is because the vast 
majority of existing studies suffer from at least one of the following issues: (i) inappropriate 
or no explanation behind their choice of discrete-time or continuous-time hazard models (e.g. 
Bharath and Shumway 2008); (ii) inappropriate or no specification of baseline hazard rate 
while using discrete-time hazard models (e.g. Nam et al. 2008; Gupta et al. 2014); (iii) no test 
of proportional hazards assumption when using continuous-time Extended Cox models with 
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time-independent covariates (e.g. Liang and Park 2010); (iv) no discussion on frailty and 
recurrent events (e.g. Shumway 2001); and (v) no explanation of how they dealt with the 
issue of delayed entry (e.g. Gupta, Wilson, et al. 2014a).  
Thus, we contribute to the literature by presenting a review and analysis of popular hazard 
models in predicting corporate failure, taking into account the fundamental concerns 
discussed above. Since we often find continuous-time hazard models are being developed 
using discrete-time data (e.g. Bauer and Agarwal 2014), we also contribute to the literature 
by documenting empirical comparison of discrete-time and continuous-time hazard models. 
Multivariate hazard prediction models are developed using financial ratios obtained from 
income statements and balance sheets. The criteria for introducing covariates in multivariate 
models vary across scientific disciplines, and with underlying theoretical or atheoretical 
beliefs or assumptions. Traditionally, the vast majority of popular bankruptcy prediction 
studies report atheoretical approaches toward selection of covariates and developing 
multivariate prediction models (see among others Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Shumway 
2001; Altman and Sabato 2007; Campbell et al. 2008; Korol 2013).  The plausible theoretical 
angle that we may reason is the effect of any given covariate on firms’ default likelihood. For 
instance, we may reason that a firm with a higher proportion of debt in its capital structure is 
more likely to default than an almost identical firm with a lower amount of debt in its capital 
structure. Thus an increasing value of the financial ratio debt/total assets enhances firms’ 
default likelihood, and vice-versa. Similar analogies may be deduced for any possible 
covariate. However, with the vast number of financial ratios (or non-financial covariates) 
available, and no proper theory in place, scholars often select covariates that are either 
advocated by popular studies or that suit their empirical research. Thus, in line with the 
discussion in Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) on multivariate model building strategy, we propose an 
atheoretical econometric based model building strategy, based on covariates’ Average 
Marginal Effects (AME) and their inter-temporal discrimination ability. The reasoning 
behind this approach is that a covariate with a higher value of AME induces higher change in 
the default probability, and thus should be given priority in the covariate selection process 
compared with one with a lower value of AME. In addition, the earlier the warning signals, 
the longer the preparation time period for the forthcoming crisis. Therefore, the covariate 
with forecasting ability over a longer horizon should be preferred to the covariate with the 
shorter horizon.  
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We also contribute to the fast growing literature on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) bankruptcy by comparing SMEs failure prediction models developed using different 
definitions of default events. In particular, our comparison involves default definitions based 
on: (i) legal consequences (Chapter 7/11 bankruptcy filings in the United States); (ii) 
financial health, as discussed in Pindado et al. (2008) and Keasey et al. (2014); and (iii) both 
legal and financial health of an SME. Our legal definition classifies a firm as default when it 
files for bankruptcy under the legal bankruptcy law (Event 1), which is usually Chapter 7/11 
in the United States. Our second definition follows the financial distress definition provided 
by Keasey et al. (2014) and classifies a firm as financially distressed if it reports earnings of 
less than its financial expenses for two consecutive years, has net worth/total debt less than 
one, and experiences negative growth in net worth for the same two consecutive time periods 
(Event 2). The definition of SMEs default that we propose combines Event 1 and Event 2, and 
classifies a firm as default when it files for legal bankruptcy alongside financial distress 
(Event 3). The detailed analogy behind this default definition is discussed in Section 3. A 
recent study by Lin et al. (2012) on SMEs default prediction follows a similar line, but 
predicts SMEs default using different definitions of financial distress.  
Our research differentiates itself from Lin et al (2012) in several respects. First, we present 
our analysis based on a sample of US SMEs, whereas their study employs sample of UK 
SMEs. They use static binary logistic regression to establish their empirical validations, while 
we use superior dynamic hazard models. Finally, they use flow-based (earnings/interest 
payable) and stock-based (1 – total liabilities/total assets) insolvency indicators to group the 
firms in their sample into four groups of financial health (which correspond to their four 
different definitions of financial distress), while our distress definitions are more realistic and 
arguably superior (see Tinoco and Wilson (2013) and Keasey et al. (2014) for relevant 
discussion). 
Our test results, obtained by employing firm-year observations of the US SMEs, provide 
convincing evidence. To establish the empirical validation, we calculate a wide range of 
financial ratios to gauge a firm’s performance from liquidity, solvency, profitability, 
leverage, activity, growth and financing dimensions. Then, following the suggestion of 
Hosmer Jr et al. (2013), we use appropriate strategies to narrow down our list of covariates, 
and develop multivariate models. First, in line with the theoretical arguments, the discrete-
time duration-dependent hazard models that we develop with logit and complementary log-
log (clog-log) links provide superior model fit compared with continuous-time Extended Cox 
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models, as they have much lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values than Cox 
models across all default definitions. However, all three econometric specifications lead to 
almost identical within sample and hold-out sample classification performance, thus one 
might be tempted to be indifferent to the choice of hazard specification. Moreover, if the 
event of interest is not duration dependent (i.e. some functional form of time or time 
dummies are not significant in the multivariate model), with hazard rates being invariant or 
vary mildly across different time periods, then the complications of hazard models may not 
be worthwhile considering the marginal gain one would obtain using such models. But in 
case of duration dependence, we suggest the use of discrete-time hazard model with logit link 
to model interval censored or discrete-time data since it produces minimum overall error of 
prediction models developed along with several other benefits. Like, it is well understood by 
researchers and thus does not require learning new statistical techniques; can be estimated 
with any statistical software package; and most importantly, can be extended easily in a 
variety of ways to suit one’s purpose. While developing our multivariate models we find that, 
in the presence of financial covariates, about 90% of the time dummies that we use as 
baseline hazard specifications are insignificant, with very high values of standard errors. Thus 
we follow Shumway (2001) and use the natural logarithm of firms’ annual age (variable 
AGE) as the baseline hazard specification. This specification is significant in most of our 
multivariate hazard models, but this objective can easily be achieved by developing 
regression models using panel logistic regression techniques that use some functional form of 
time to capture any duration dependency. Although Shumway (2001) argues that hazard 
models are superior to competing static models, variable AGE in his multivariate models are 
insignificant, so how can it be used reliably to predict duration specific hazard rates when this 
is primarily why hazard models are used? Unlike areas such as medicine or health economics, 
duration specific prediction of hazard rates is not common in bankruptcy or financial distress 
prediction, thus we do not see any real need for hazard models if similar objectives can be 
achieved using much simpler panel logistic regression that controls for any duration 
dependencies.  
Second, the default definition that we propose (Event 3) performs best in classifying 
defaulted firms. A default definition based on firms’ financial health is superior to default 
definition based on legal consequences, while a default definition that considers both legal 
consequence and firms’ financial health is best. These differences in classification 
performance emphasise the fact that not all firms that file for legal bankruptcy do so purely 
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due to financial difficulties - a significant number of firms consider it a planned exit strategy 
(Bates 2005). Furthermore, we also test the efficiency and stability of covariates suggested by 
the most popular study on US SMEs bankruptcy prediction, by Altman and Sabato (2007). 
Based on our test results, we conclude that the covariates they suggest fail to exhibit 
satisfactory discriminatory power across all default definitions and up to three lagged time 
periods, and find several other financial ratios which are better performers. Their suggestion 
might be biased due to their sample selection process, while our study employs near 
population data of US SMEs. 
We expect this study to be a useful guide to academic scholars and practitioners interested in 
building hazard models for making binary predictions. The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 discusses common concerns regarding the use of hazard models and how 
they can be rectified; Section 3 discusses various default definitions that we consider in our 
study; Section 4 provides detailed discussion of our dataset, choice of covariates and 
methodology; in Section 5 we report and discuss our empirical findings and, finally, Section 
6 concludes our findings.  
2. Common Concerns of Hazard Models  
2.1 Discrete-time vs Continuous-time Hazard Model 
In bankruptcy studies, the survival time, which is the duration or time-to-event, is generally 
measured in quarterly or annual units, and the time scale used may be discrete or continuous. 
If the time of occurrence of an event is precisely known, continuous-time hazard models are 
employed, otherwise a discrete-time hazard model is an appropriate choice when the event 
takes place within a given time interval and the precise time is unknown (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2012). Thus, from a theoretical point of view discrete-time hazard models are an 
appropriate choice, as a firm may file for bankruptcy anytime within a quarter or a year. 
However, in both models the probability of occurrence of an event at time t is being 
modelled. The dependent variable in a continuous-time model is the hazard rate, but in a 
discrete-time model it is the odds ratio (if modelling is done using standard logit/probit 
models). However, recent studies do not provide appropriate explanation behind their choice 
between discrete-time (eg. Campbell et al. 2008; Gupta et al. 2014) and continuous-time 
model (eg. Bharath and Shumway 2008; Chen and Hill 2013). Furthermore, the required 
precision of the timing to an event is significantly dependent on the research question and 
data restrictions. Studies also suggest that results obtained from continuous-time and discrete-
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time methods are virtually identical in most models (Yamaguchi 1991; Allison 2014). Having 
said that, the performance of a bankruptcy prediction model is evaluated based on some non-
parametric classification measures such as misclassification matrix, or area under receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve (see Anderson (2007) for further details). Despite the 
theoretical differences between continuous-time and discrete-time models, if they lead to 
identical classification performance then this theoretical difference is of no practical 
relevance. Thus, we compare the classification performance of most widely used discrete-
time duration-dependent hazard models (see among others Shumway 2001, Nam et al. 2008) 
with the most popular continuous-time duration-dependent Cox model (see among others 
Bharath and Shumway 2008; Chen and Hill 2013) to find any differences in their 
classification performance. If there are no differences, then the Cox model is a reasonable and 
convenient choice (although discrete-time hazard model is more appropriate), as it does not 
require any baseline hazard specification unlike discrete-time models (see Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2012).  
2.2 Specification of Baseline Hazard Rate 
The final step before estimation of discrete-time hazard models is the specification of 
baseline hazard function, i.e. the hazard rate when all the covariates are set to zero. The 
baseline hazard can be estimated using time dummies (Beck et al. 1998) or some other 
functional form of time (see Jenkins (2005) for details). However, recent studies seem to 
distort this idea of baseline hazard and have established their own version of baseline hazard 
that includes, for instance,  macroeconomic variables (Nam et al. 2008) or insolvency risk 
(Gupta et al. 2014) in the baseline hazard function (it is more appropriate to acknowledge 
them as control variables). While several studies do not report any baseline hazard function in 
their discrete hazard model (see among others Campbell et al. 2008; Bauer and Agarwal 
2014). Omitting baseline specification (e.g. time dummies, ln(age) etc.) is equivalent to 
assuming that the baseline hazard is constant and that the model is duration-independent. In 
light of the basic theory of survival analysis, this is inappropriate.  
We address this misleading concern in this study and show the steps to be followed in 
specifying the baseline hazard function while developing a discrete hazard model. This can 
be done by defining time-varying covariates that bear functional relationships with survival 
times. Popular specifications are log(survival time), polynomial in survival time, fully non-
parametric and piece-wise constant (Jenkins 2005). Duration-interval-specific dummy 
variables need to be created for specifying a fully non-parametric baseline hazard. The 
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number of dummy variables needs to be equals to one less than the maximum survival time in 
the dataset. For instance, if the maximum survival time is fifty years, then forty nine dummy 
variables are required for model estimation (e.g. Beck et al. 1998). However, this method 
becomes cumbersome if the maximum survival time in the dataset is very high, as in the case 
of bankruptcy databases. A reasonably convenient alternative way of specifying the baseline 
hazard function is to use the piece-wise constant method. In this, the survival times are split 
into different time intervals that are assumed to exhibit constant hazard rate. However, one 
must note that if there exist time intervals or time dummies with no events then one must 
drop the relevant firm-time observation with no event from the estimation, otherwise the 
duration specific hazard rates cannot be estimated for these time intervals/dummies (see 
Jenkins 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Considering the estimation convenience, 
one might be tempted to use the piece-wise constant specification of baseline hazard rate. 
However, if the hazard curve shows frequent and continuous steep rises and falls, then fully 
non-parametric baseline hazard specification might be an appropriate choice. 
2.3 Proportional Hazards Assumption for Cox Model 
Studies which employ continuous-time Cox models are mostly silent on the critical test of 
proportional hazards (PH) assumptions  for time-independent covariates (e.g. Liang and Park 
2010). The PH assumption implies that the hazard rate of any particular subject is a constant 
proportion of the hazard rate of any other subject across time (Mills 2011). The violation of 
this assumption might lead to overestimation (the covariate violates this assumption and 
exhibits an increasing hazard ratio over time) or underestimation (the covariate violates this 
assumption and exhibits a decreasing hazard ratio over time) of hazard risk (Mills 2011). It 
also results in incorrect standard errors and a decrease in the power of significance tests 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). The violation of PH assumption is a frequent 
phenomenon, and thus it should always be checked and reported in studies. That said, Allison 
(2010)  warns that it is necessary to worry not only about the violation of the PH assumption, 
but also about other basic requirements such as incorporation of relevant explanatory 
variables. He also asserts that the violation of PH assumption is often covariate specific and 
excessive.  Although all the covariates that we employ in this study are time-dependent, if 
one also employs time-independent covariates, then one should take cognizance of this 
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serious and neglected concern and use appropriate methods to test, report and rectify any 
violation of the proportional hazards assumptions
1
. 
2.4 Frailty and Recurrent Events 
Another highly neglected area of concern is frailty and recurrent events. Correlation of event 
time occurs when firms experiencing a default event belong to a particular cluster or group 
such as industry, geographic location or, in the case of recurrent events, where a firm 
experiences a default event more than once in its lifetime. In the United States (US), the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code) governs the legal processes involved in 
dealing with corporate financial distress. It provides firms facing financial distress with a 
liquidation process (Chapter 7) or a reorganization process (Chapter 11)
2
. Chapter 7 leads to 
permanent shutdown of a financially distressed firm, while Chapter 11 aims at rehabilitation 
of financially distressed but economically viable firms. Hotchkiss (1995) examines 197 
publicly traded firms that filed for Chapter 11 protection from 1979 to 1988 and later 
recovered from Chapter 11 as publicly traded firms. He reports that 40% of the firms 
continue to experience operating losses and 32% either restructure their debt or re-enter 
bankruptcy in the three years following the acceptance of reorganization plans. Thus a firm 
may witness multiple distress events in its lifetime. Given that these issues of clustering and 
recurrent events are an integral part of the real-life environment, they should be made an 
essential and standard part of contemporary event history analysis (see Box‐Steffensmeier 
and De Boef (2006) and Mills (2011) for advanced discussion). The solution is to introduce a 
frailty term in the hazard models. Frailty is an unobserved random proportionality factor that 
modifies the hazard function to account for random effects, association and unobserved 
heterogeneity in hazard models (Mills 2011). The exclusion of a frailty term implicitly 
assumes that all firms are homogeneous, which implies that all the firms are prone to 
experience default in the same way, with the duration of defaults considered to be 
independent from one another. However, in reality some firms are more ‘frail’ and thus have 
a higher likelihood of experiencing default. Therefore, our empirical analysis also accounts 
for this neglected concern while developing hazard models. 
                                                 
1
 See Kleinbaum and Klein (2012) for detailed understanding about various tests of proportional hazards 
assumption for time-independent covariates. A Cox model with time-dependent covariates does not need to 
satisfy the proportional hazards assumption and is called an Extended Cox model. However, if the model 
employs both time-dependent and time-independent covariates, then PH assumption for time-independent 
covariates must be satisfied.  
2
 Although the law provides other provisions, we consider only Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 as the vast majority of 
the financially distressed firms file for either of these two. 
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2.5 Delayed Entry  
In time-to-event studies the origin of time scale is an important consideration, as at this point 
in time a firm becomes at risk of experiencing the financial distress event. This is firms’ 
incorporation date in bankruptcy studies. However, in cases where incorporation dates are 
unknown, firms’ age or the earliest available date of information in the databases serves as 
useful proxy. A firm’s incorporation date may differ from the start date of sampling period; 
as a result the time it becomes at risk does not coincide with the start of the sampling period. 
This leads to delayed entry, which means that a firm becomes at risk before entering the 
study. Thus the appropriate likelihood contribution under delayed entry is obtained by 
allowing the firm to start contributing observations from time period 𝑡𝑘 + 1 and discarding 
prior time periods (see section 14.2.6 of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Here, 𝑡𝑘 is the 
time period for which a firm has already been at risk when it enters the research study. 
3. Different Default Definitions for SMEs 
Traditionally, the debate about financial distress has been rooted in the literature pertaining to 
firms’ capital structure, with particular relevance to the cost of financial distress (see Altman 
and Hotchkiss (2006) for an overview). However, current studies also highlight its growing 
importance in the context of modelling firms’ insolvency hazards (e.g. Keasey et al. 2014). 
Recent literature pertaining to firms’ default prediction argue that a ‘financial distress’ based 
definition of the default contingent upon a firm’s earnings and market value is more 
appropriate than a definition based on legal consequence (Pindado et al. 2008; Tinoco and 
Wilson 2013; Keasey et al. 2014). We see a range of definitions in the empirical literature 
that have been successfully used to define/proxy firms’ default/distress risk. Most of the 
empirical models employ a definition of default that is in line with some legal consequence 
(e.g. Chapter 11/7 Bankruptcy Code in the United States; United Kingdom Insolvency Act), 
which lead to a well-defined and clearly separated population of bankrupt versus non-
bankrupt firms. This remains the most widely used method of classifying financially 
distressed firms in the empirical literature that employs binary choice statistical models to 
predict firms’ financial distress  (see among others Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Hillegeist et 
al. 2004; Gupta et al. 2014a). However, legal definition of default may suffer from 
noteworthy issues. Since insolvency involves lengthy legal processes, there often exists a 
significant time gap between real/economic default date and legal default date. UK 
companies exhibit a significant time gap of up to 3 years (average of about 1.17 years) 
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between the time they enter into the state of financial distress and the legal default dates 
(Tinoco and Wilson 2013), while companies in the US stop reporting their financial 
statements about two years before filing for bankruptcy (Theodossiou 1993). Recent changes 
to insolvency legislation (for instance, the Enterprise Act 2004 in the UK and Chapter 11 in 
the US) do consider this problem and suggest several stages of financial distress based upon 
the severances of financial distress.  
Further, a financially distressed firm may go for a formal reorganization involving the court 
system or an informal reorganization through the market participants (e.g. Blazy et al. 2013). 
Debt restructuring, asset sale and infusion of new capital from external sources are the three 
most commonly used market-based or private methods of resolving financial distress (Senbet 
and Wang 2010). Debt restructuring allows a financially distressed firm to renegotiate the 
outstanding debt obligation or related credit terms with its creditors but is critically subject to 
whether the debt obligation is due to private or public entity. As an alternative to this, a 
distressed firm may sell-off some of its existing assets to reduce its outstanding liability, or 
may undertake new profitable investment opportunities, which may eventually help it to 
overcome its misery. Despite having profitable investment opportunities, a financially 
distressed firm might not be able to generate additional funding due to the high risk involved 
in financing distress firms and the “debt overhang” problem, as discussed by Myers (1977). 
As a consequence, infusion of new capital from external sources is rarely observed in the 
resolution of financial distress. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that a financially 
distressed firm may not file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 protection, and choose a private 
workout method of resolving financial distress. Gilson et al. (1990) and Gilson (1997) report 
that firms avoid legal bankruptcy processes by out of court negotiation with creditors. 
However, under the binary classification based on legal consequences, a financially 
distressed firm which has not filed for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 is not considered to be a 
financially distressed firm. There is, therefore, a clear need for a mechanism to identify 
financially distressed firms beyond the legal definitions. In this context, we find the argument 
of Pindado et al. (2008) highly relevant, and thus explore the following definitions of SMEs’ 
default events: 
Event 1 – Any firm which files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7/11 is considered default and 
is said to have experienced Event 1. The vast majority of empirical literature on SMEs default 
prediction employs this kind of binary classification based on some legal consequences to 
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classify a firm as healthy or bankrupt (see among others Altman and Sabato 2007; Gupta, et 
al. 2014b). 
Event 2 –  Here we follow the financial distress definition provided by Keasey et al. (2014) 
while classifying a SME as default under Event 2. In particular, we consider a firm to be 
financially distressed (have experienced Event 2) if its EBITDA (earnings before interest tax 
depreciation and amortization) is less than its financial expenses for two consecutive years, 
the net worth/total debt is less than one, and the net worth experienced negative growth 
between the two periods. Additionally, a firm is also recorded as financially distressed in the 
year immediately following these distress events. 
Event 3 – The third default definition that we propose considers both legal and finance-based 
definitions of distress when classifying a firm as default. A firm is classified as default under 
Event 3 if it satisfies the conditions of Event 1 and Event 2 simultaneously. That is, besides 
being financially distressed, it should also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7/11. Thus a 
firm is said to experience Event 3 in a given year if it experiences Event 1 in that same year 
and Event 2 the year earlier, the rationale being that not all business closures are due to 
financial difficulties. Many file for legal bankruptcies as part of their planned exit strategies 
(see among others Bates 2005). This definition can therefore identify firms which follow 
legal exit routes purely due to financial difficulties. 
4. Empirical Methods 
This section discusses the source and use of dataset, the selection of explanatory variables, 
and statistical models used in our study. 
4.1 Dataset 
To predict default events over the next one year horizon, our empirical analysis employs 
annual firm-level accounting data from the Compustat database. We consider a relatively 
long analysis period which includes all SMEs that entered the Compustat database after 
January 1950 but before April 2015. In line with the widely popular definition of SMEs 
provided by the European Union
3
, we consider a firm as an SME if it has less than 250 
                                                 
3
 We are aware of the fact that the US Small Business Administration (SBA) defines SMEs differently. Broadly 
it considers a firm as an SME if it has less than 500 employees and annual turnover of less than $7.5 million. 
However, their precise definition varies across industrial sectors to reflect industry differences. For instance, a 
mining firm with less than 1000 employees, a general building and heavy construction firm with annual turnover 
of less than $36.5 million and a manufacturing firm with less than 1500 employees are all classified as small 
businesses as per SBA (https://www.sba.gov/contracting/getting-started-contractor/make-sure-you-meet-sba-
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employees. In Compustat, a company with a “TL” footnote on status alert (data item STALT) 
indicates that the company is in bankruptcy or liquidation (i.e. Chapter 7/11). Generally, a 
company will have a "TL" footnote on status alert - quarterly (and annual) for the ﬁrst and 
following quarters (and years) the company is in Chapter 11. An "AG" footnote will appear 
on Total Assets (AT_FN) – quarterly, on the quarter the company emerges from Chapter 11. 
Thus, within its lifetime, a firm may go for multiple bankruptcy filings in the form of Chapter 
11, and may remain in the bankruptcy state until it emerges. Consequently, taking the 
bankruptcy filing date as the bankruptcy indicator ignores the possible subsequent bankruptcy 
states. Thus, our first definition (Event 1) considers a firm under bankruptcy when its status 
alert is “TL” and healthy otherwise. This classification is consistent with the basic notion of 
survival analysis in which a subject may remain in a given risky state for more than one time 
period, and thus experience an event of interest for more than one time period.  
Table 1 reports age-wise distribution of censored and distressed firms under respective 
default events (see Section 3 for definitions of various default events). We proxy a firm’s age 
as the earliest year for which financial information for that firm is available in the Compustat 
database. In Compustat, 1950 is the earliest point in time for which financial information is 
available, therefore in order to get the complete financial history of a firm, we selected only 
those firms which entered the Compustat database after 1950. Further, firms belonging to the 
Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities; Finance; Insurance & Real Estate; and 
Public Administration industrial sectors have been excluded from our empirical analysis (see 
Table 2 for details). This is to ensure homogeneity within our sample, as financial firms have 
different asset-liability structures and the rest are heavily regulated by governments. It should 
be noted that the same firms might have multiple entries and exits in our database. For 
instance, when an existing SME reports a number of employees over 250, it exits our sample 
and returns only when its number of employees falls below 250. We also exclude subsidiary 
firms if the ‘stock ownership code’ (Compustat data item ‘stko’) is ‘1’ (subsidiary of a 
publicly traded company) or ‘2’ (subsidiary of a company that is not publicly traded) in the 
Compustat database. 
                                                                                                                                                        
size-standards/summary-size-standards-industry-sector; accessed on May 18, 2016 ). This may not be a 
convenient workable definition from the lender’s point of view. Many of these firms are too big to be called 
SMEs in the real sense, despite being classified as small firms as per SBA. They do this primarily to determine 
the eligibility of a firm for SBA financial assistance, or for its other programs. Thus we follow a more 
appropriate and popular definition of SMEs provided by the European Union for this study. The most popular 
study on predicting bankruptcy of US SMEs by Altman and Sabato (2007) also follows the European Union’s 
definition of SMEs. They consider firms as SMEs if they report sales revenue of less than $65 million 
(approximately €50 million, as suggested by the European Union). 
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As reported in Table 1, for any given age, the numbers of firms experiencing Event 3 is 
significantly lower than the number of firms experiencing Event 1. This shows that legal 
bankruptcy filing due to financial distress is not a dominant exist strategy for US SMEs. 
Thus, vast majority of bankruptcy filings may be due to planned exit strategies (e.g. Bates 
2005) which may not be triggered due to financial difficulties. One may also attribute this 
low frequency of Event 3 to the fact that, vast majority of SMEs are unlevered and do not 
incur any interest expense. Thus, unlevered SMEs facing financial difficulties (in meeting 
their operating expenses or trade payables) cannot be classified as financially distressed as 
per Keasey et al. (2014)’s definition of financial distress, and thus they do not experience 
Event 2. We do acknowledge this as a form of shortcoming of our study, but the cost of 
bankruptcy or financial distress is highest when external debt is introduced into the capital 
structure. In case of default of a levered firm, significant portion of bankruptcy cost is borne 
by providers of debt capital. In this context, we, in line with similar earlier studies (e.g. 
Pindado et al. 2008, Keasey et al. 2014), find a definition of financial distress contingent 
upon a firms’ ability to meet its financial expenses to be most appropriate for building default 
prediction models. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
4.2 Selection of Variables 
Dependent Variable: As discussed in Section 3, in this study we consider Event 1, Event 2 
and Event 3 as dependent variables for the estimation of respective hazard models. 
Independent Variables: To develop multivariate hazard models we employ a wide range of 
financial ratios that have an established reputation in predicting firms’ default risk. Our 
choice of covariates reflects firms’ performance from leverage, liquidity, solvency, activity, 
profitability and interest coverage dimensions. Specifically, we incorporate covariates from 
popular studies on SMEs bankruptcy, like Altman and Sabato (2007), Lin et al. (2012), Gupta 
et al. (2014), and a recent book on credit risk management by Joseph (2013).   
Leverage – the level of leverage reflect financial position of firms, which in turn determines 
their capacity to raise new capital through borrowing and meet debt obligations. To measure 
the financial fragility of firms, we use several variables reported as useful proxy of leverage 
in earlier literature. A Higher value of total liabilities/tangible total assets (TLTA) and total 
liabilities/net worth (TLNW) signifies higher likelihood of failure. Capital employed divided 
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by total liabilities (CETL) is used as an inverse measure of leverage and firms in financial 
distress are expected to be heavily dependent on borrowed funds and hence are expected to 
have a lower value of CETL. More importantly, inability to meet short-term debt financing 
immediately can be a trigger element in a firm’s termination, therefore, short-term debt 
relative to equity book value (STDEBV) is expected to be critical immediately prior to 
failure. 
Liquidity – during difficult time, firms may weaken their liquidity position in order to meet 
immediate payments (Zavgren 1985). We employ a number of measures linked to firms’ 
liquidity that examine whether a company has adequate cash or cash equivalents to meet its 
current obligations without liquidating other non-cash assets such as stocks. We expect that a 
higher value of following proxies to have a negative effect on firms’ failure probability; cash 
and short-term investment relative to total assets (CTA), cash and marketable securities to 
current liabilities (CHR), current assets relative to current liabilities (CR) and quick ratio 
(CHR). 
Profitability – typically a firm approaching failure witness earnings deterioration. This is 
because when earnings are impaired, firms’ liquidity position gets fragile and thus the default 
on debt service increases. Having said that, Taffler (1983) empirically show that short-term 
liquidity is less important in magnitude to liabilities and earning abilities. This is because, 
even when firms’ liquidity position is weak, capital supplier are more inclined to provide 
funds to firms with high level of earning, therefore, a lower probability of default. To further 
explore this relationship, we initially employ a number of variables which reflect the strength 
of firms’ profitability at different stages of its earning process: earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization to total assets (EBITDATA), return on equity (ROE), operating 
profit to capital employed (OPEC), net income to sale (NIS) and operation profit to net 
income (OPNI). Healthy firms are characterized by higher value of these ratios than their 
distressed counterparts. 
Financing – default occurs when a firm fails to pay its financial obligations. Hence, the 
probability of this incident increases monotonically with the level of financial claims on 
either the level of its assets, revenue stream or profitability/retained earnings. Following this 
statement, we explore the discriminatory power of financial expenses relative to total assets 
(FETA), financial expenses relative to sales (FES) and earnings before interest taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation over interest expenses (EBITDAIE). We also explore retained 
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earnings to total assets (RETA) which indicates the cumulative profitability over a firm’s life. 
Thus, a firm’s age may have a direct impact on this variable, as younger firms may have a 
lower chance to generate a higher level of retained earnings relative to older firms and hence 
a higher chance of being bankrupt. However, in the real world younger firms are more likely 
to go bankrupt than older firms. Furthermore, all financing variables can be used as an 
indication of financial constraints. Given the fact that SMEs are normally classified as 
financially constrained firms, it is expected to observe that these variables contribute a higher 
magnitude to the failure of these firms.  
Activity – the variables related to firms’ activity evaluate how efficiently a manager is 
exploiting its assets which in turn affect firms’ performance in the long run. Working capital 
to sale (WCS) and to total assets (WCTA) indicates whether any deficiency in financial 
management skills is shrinking current assets to total assets or sale. We also utilise other 
activity ratios related to debtors (DCP, debtor collection period) and creditors (TCP, trade 
creditor payment period) to examine the impact of firm’s credit policies on its immediate 
ability to meet its financial obligations. The inclusion of these variables is important as 
Hudson (1986) states that many SMEs rely heavily on short-term financing through trade 
creditors. Additionally, the discriminatory power sale to total assets (STA) and stock holding 
period (SHP) has also been explored.  
Growth – Previous studies find that accessing to finance depends on the firm size. Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006) repot that different size categories (micro, small, medium, and large) 
face different degree of burden in obtaining external financing, they further emphasise how 
this burden play a major obstacle toward their growth. Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) report 
that survival rate is more than doubles for firms with higher growth rate. We include different 
variables to examine if the lower rate of growth contributes to the failure of SMEs. Sales 
growth (SAG) create the basic source of the bulk of a firm’s income, they can also be an 
indicator of business risk and managers’ capability in dealing with other competitors. Capital 
growth (CAG) and Earnings growth (ERG) are also included, as a higher rate of growth 
indicates a growing capacity to meet financial obligations and vice-versa. 
The final covariate that we consider is the ratio between income taxes to total assets (TTA). 
A heathy profitable firm is expected to pay its tax obligations on time, and is also expected to 
pay higher amount of tax in comparison to an identical unhealthy less profitable firms. Thus, 
a higher value of TTA is expected to bring lower failure likelihood and vice-versa. 
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Table 3 lists all the covariates and their respective definitions. To eliminate the influence of 
outliers on our statistical estimates, we restrict the range of all our financial ratios between 
the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
Control Variables: Considering the suggestion of Gupta, Gregoriou, et al. (2014) we control 
for the diversity between micro, small and medium firms by employing dummy variables for 
micro (less than 10 employees) and small (greater than 9 but less than 50 employees) firms in 
our multivariate models. To control the volatility in the macroeconomic environment 
affecting specific industrial sectors, we calculate an additional measure of industry risk 
(RISK) as the failure rate (number of firms experiencing the event of interest in the respective 
industrial sector in a given year/total number of firms in that industrial sector in that year) in 
each of the seven industrial sectors in a given year. Higher values indicate a higher risk of 
default, and vice versa.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.3 Hazard Model 
4.3.1 Basic Hazard Model 
Survival analysis deals with the analysis of the time to the occurrence of an event, which in 
this study is the time until a financial default event. Suppose T is a non-negative random 
variable which denotes the time to a distress event and t represents any specific value of 
interest for the random variable T. If, instead of referring to T’s probability density function 
as 𝑓(𝑡) or its cumulative distribution function (CDF) as 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡), we think of T’s 
survivor function, 𝑆(𝑡) or its hazard function, ℎ(𝑡), the understanding of survival analysis 
becomes much clearer (Cleves et al. 2010). The survivor function expresses the probability of 
survival beyond time t, which is simply the reverse CDF of T, i.e.: 
𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
At 𝑡 = 0 the survivor function is equals to one, and moves toward zero as 𝑡 approaches 
infinity. The relationship between survivor function and hazard function (also known as the 
conditional failure rate at a particular time⁡𝑡) is mathematically defined as follows: 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
Pr⁡(𝑡 + ∆𝑡 > 𝑇 > 𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡
=
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
=
−𝑑⁡ln𝑆(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
;⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
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In simple words, the hazard rate is the (limiting) probability that the failure event occurs 
within a given time interval, given that the subject has survived to the start of that time 
interval, divided by the width of the time interval. The hazard rate varies from zero to infinity 
and may be increasing, decreasing or constant over time. A hazard rate of zero signifies no 
risk of failure at that instant, while infinity signifies certainty of failure at that instant.   
4.3.2 Extended Cox Model 
An elegant and computationally feasible way to estimate the hazard function (2) is to use the 
semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards (CPH) model (Cox 1972, 1975) as shown in the 
following equation:  
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡). exp(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3) 
Here, 𝑥𝑖
′ is the transpose of covariates vector x𝑖, β is the vector of regression parameters and 
ℎ0(𝑡) is the arbitrary unspecified baseline hazard function (the hazard risk that the subject i 
faces in absence of covariates; i.e. 𝑥 = 0). The regression parameters (βs) are estimated using 
the partial likelihood function, which takes into account censored survival times and 
eliminates the unspecified baseline hazard term ℎ0(𝑡). CPH model treats time as continuous, 
and is semi-parametric in the sense that the model does not make any assumptions related to 
the shape
4
 of the hazard function over time. 
 
Some of the factors (leverage ratio, profitability ratio, volatility, etc.) affecting firms’ survival 
vary with time, but the fixed CPH model as highlighted in Equation (3) does not allow for 
time-varying covariates. However, inclusion of time-varying covariates in the CPH 
framework is relatively easy and thus enables us to predict dynamic survival probability over 
the life of the firm. The CPH model can be generalized to allow for the covariate vector 𝑥 to 
be time-varying as follows: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡). exp(𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′𝛽)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
where 𝑥(𝑡) is the covariate vector at time 𝑡. The rate of change of time-varying covariates is 
different for different subjects, and hence the estimated hazard ratio does not remain constant 
over time. However, the inclusion of time-varying covariates is not problematic for the partial 
                                                 
4
 It could be increasing, decreasing, and then increasing or any shape we may imagine. But it assumes that 
whatever the general shape of the hazard function, it is same for all subjects. 
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likelihood estimation (Allison 2010), and hence the CPH model can be easily improved to 
allow for non-proportional hazard risks. It implies that a general hazard model which does 
not have the restrictive assumption of constant proportional hazard ratio can be generalized 
by inclusion of both duration-dependent and duration-independent covariates in the same 
model. However, a CPH model with time-varying covariates is no longer a proportional 
hazards model, and a CPH model with time-varying covariates is appropriately called the 
Extended Cox model (see Kleinbaum and Klein 2012). Additionally, the time-varying 
covariates do not need to satisfy the proportional hazards assumption. However, if the model 
also includes time-independent covariates, then appropriate test of proportionality is 
suggested (see Kleinbaum and Klein 2012).  One major advantage of the Cox method is that 
it easily addresses the problem of right censoring, but it suffers from a major disadvantage of 
proportional hazards assumption if time-independent covariates are also included in the 
model. One may test this restrictive proportional hazard assumption that is being neglected in 
most empirical studies by using the scaled Schoenfeld residual (Grambsch and Therneau 
1994)  rather than the Schoenfeld residual (Schoenfeld 1982). While estimating our empirical 
model we also control for unobserved heterogeneity and recurrent events by including a 
shared frailty term into our model via a multiplicative scaling factor 𝛼𝑖 (see Cleves et al. 
2010). These signify group-level frailty and are unobservable positive values assumed to 
follow the Gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance θ to be estimated using the 
development sample (see Jenkins 2005). Also, the time at which the distress event occurs is 
not really relevant for hazard risk analysis using the Cox method, but the ordering of the 
distress event is critically important. In situations where multiple firms experience the event 
of interest at the same time, the exact ordering of distress events is difficult to determine. 
Thus we use Efron's
5
 (1977) method to handle cases of tied failure times.  
Recent empirical literature highlights the use of CPH in default prediction studies (see among 
others Bharath and Shumway 2008; Chen and Hill 2013) but it is inappropriate to use the 
CPH model in discrete-time frameworks for the reasons discussed earlier, and in the 
following section. Both Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Chen and Hill (2013) are silent on 
issues pertaining to shared frailty and tied failure times, which we consider to be important 
aspects and should be addressed in empirical studies if one chooses to use the CPH modelling 
technique. 
                                                 
5
 In our analysis the risk set keeps decreasing with successive failures. Efron's (1977) method reduces the weight 
of contributions to the risk set from the subjects which exhibit tied event times in successive risk sets.  
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4.3.3 Discrete Hazard Model 
When an event may be experienced at any instant in continuous-time (exact censoring and 
survival times are recorded in relatively fine time scales such as seconds, hours or days) and 
there are no tied survival time periods, then the continuous-time survival model is an 
appropriate choice (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). However, if the data has relatively 
few censoring or survival times with tied survival time periods, then the discrete-time 
survival model is more appropriate, where coarse time-scales are generally used, for instance, 
expressing time to an event in weeks, months or years (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). 
Interval-censoring
6
 leads to discrete-time data, which is the case with our database. Here, the 
beginning and end of each time interval is same for all of the SMEs in analysis time, as the 
information is recorded on an annual basis. Thus, the event of interest may take place at any 
time within the year but it cannot be known until the information is provided at the end of the 
year. Hence, considering the discussion above we also estimate our hazard models in 
discrete-time framework with random effects (𝛼𝑖), thus controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity or shared frailty. 
The discrete-time representation of the continuous-time proportional hazard model with time-
varying covariates leads to a generalized linear model with complementary log-log (Grilli 
2005; Jenkins 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) link, specified as follows: 
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔(ℎ𝑖(𝑡)) ≡ ln{− ln(1 − ℎ𝑖(𝑡))} = 𝛽𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′ + 𝜆𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5)⁡   
Here, 𝜆𝑡 is a time-specific constant which is estimated freely for each time period t, thus 
making no assumption about the baseline hazard function within the specified time interval. 
However, in most empirical studies logit link is used over complementary log-log (clog-log) 
link as specified in Equation 6: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡(𝑌 = 1) =
𝑒𝛼(𝑡)+⁡𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝛼(𝑡)+⁡𝑥(𝑡)𝑖
′𝛽
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6) 
where α(t) captures the baseline hazard rate and⁡𝑃𝑖,𝑡(𝑌 = 1) is the probability of experiencing 
the event of interest by subject i at time t. This will produce very similar results as long as the 
time intervals are small (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012) and sample bad rate (% of failed 
to non-failed) is small (Jenkins 2005). One may also choose probit link function, if one 
                                                 
6
 The event is experienced in continuous-time but we only record the time interval within which the event takes 
place. 
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strongly believes that the underlying distribution of the process being modelled is normal, or 
if the event under study is not a binary outcome but a proportion (e.g. proportion of 
population at different income levels). While these specifications will generally yield results 
that are quite similar, there are significant differences in terms of non-proportionality (see 
Sueyoshi (1995) for detailed discussion). Thus, we estimate our discrete hazard models with 
clog-log and logit links, and analyse any differences in the magnitude of coefficients and 
classification performance of multivariate models developed. 
4.4 Performance Evaluation 
To gauge the classification performance of the models developed to identify distressed firms, 
we estimate area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (AUROC). This 
curve originates from the signal detection theory, which shows how the receiver detects 
existence of signal in presence of noise. It is obtained by plotting the probability of detecting 
true-positive (sensitivity) (a firm actually defaults and the model classifies it as expected 
default) and false-negative (1 – specificity) (a firm actually defaults but the model classifies it 
as expected non-default) for an entire range of possible cutpoints (these are probability 
values). Cutpoint, c, is defined to obtain a derived binary variable by comparing each 
estimated probability with c. If the estimated probability is greater than c, the value of the 
derived binary variable equals to 1, or 0 otherwise. AUROC is now considered to be the most 
popular non-parametric method for evaluating a fitted prediction model’s ability to assign, in 
general, higher probabilities of the event of interest to the subgroup which develops the event 
of interest (dependent variable = 1) than it does to the subgroup which do not develop the 
event of interest (dependent variable = 0). The AUROC provides a measure of the prediction 
model’s ability to discriminate between those firms which experience the event of interest, 
versus those who do not. Its value ranges from 0.5 to 1.0, which encapsulates the 
classification performance of the model developed. AUROC of 1 denotes a model with 
perfect prediction accuracy, and 0.5 suggests no discrimination ability. In general there is no 
‘golden rule’ regarding the value of AUROC, however anything between 0.7 and 0.8 is 
acceptable, while above 0.8 is considered to be excellent (Hosmer Jr et al. 2013). 
5. Results and Discussion 
We begin this section with analysis of key measures of descriptive statistics of our covariates, 
along with relevant discussion pertaining to correlation among them. We perform univariate 
regression analysis of each covariate in turn using respective event definition and respective 
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econometric specification, to understand any unexpected behaviour in their discriminatory 
performance. We then discuss development and performance evaluation of multivariate 
discrete-time hazard models developed using logit and clog-log links. Finally, we develop 
multivariate extended Cox models and provide a comparative discussion on the performance 
of multivariate models developed using different default definitions. To gauge any temporal 
variation in the explanatory power of our covariates, we perform our regression analysis 
using covariates that are lagged by T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3 time periods. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Inspection of descriptive statistics gives us an initial understanding about the variability of 
covariates and the potential biasness that may arise in the multivariate setup due to any 
unexpected extreme variability. We expect the mean of covariates that exhibit positive 
relationships with the insolvency/distress hazard to be higher for distressed groups (status 
indicator = 1) than for their healthy or censored counterparts (e.g. STDEBV in Table 4). On 
the contrary, the mean of covariates that show negative relationships with the insolvency 
hazard is expected to be lower for distressed groups than for their healthy counterparts (e.g. 
CTA in Table 4). A closer look at Table 4 reveals that the mean, median and standard 
deviation of most of the covariates under respective event definitions are as we expect 
without any extreme variability. However, EBITDAIE and STDEBV raise some serious 
concerns. The mean of EBITDAIE is very high, as most of the firms in our sample do not 
incur (or incur very little) interest expenses
7
. This leads to a very high difference between its 
mean and median values, resulting in a highly skewed distribution and very high value of 
standard deviation. Although STDEBV and TLNW are positively related to firms’ default 
probability, the mean of the default group is significantly lower than the censored group 
under Event 3, which is quite surprising as we expect otherwise. We also observe that the 
mean of respective covariates across different default definitions in Table 4 reveal very little 
variation in value. This signals little variation in the classification performance of 
multivariate models developed, and is confirmed by our results in Section 5.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The correlation matrix in Table 5 shows that some of the covariates exhibit moderate to 
strong correlation with other covariates. RETA shows a strong positive correlation of 
                                                 
7
 While calculating the ratio EBITDAIE, zero interest expense (IE) for all firm-year observations is replaced 
with $1 to avoid missing values. 
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approximately 0.65 with EBITDATA, supporting the belief that SMEs primarily rely on 
internal sources for their funding requirements, thus they end up retaining a significant 
portion of their income. Issues associated with multicollinearity therefore need to be 
addressed carefully when developing multivariate models. Section 5.3.2 on model building 
strategy discusses how we address this issue in this study.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
5.2 Univariate Regression and Average Marginal Effects 
It is always advisable to do some univariate analysis before proceeding to estimation of 
multivariate models. In survival analysis the standard approach is to initially look at Kaplan-
Meier survival curves of all categorical covariates to get an insight into the shape of survival 
functions and proportionality of each group
8
. Popular non-parametric tests of equality of 
survival functions, like the log-rank test and the Wilcoxon–Breslow–Gehan test (see Cleves 
et al. 2010), are also reported. However, it is not feasible to calculate Kaplan-Meier curves or 
conduct these non-parametric tests for continuous predictors as continuous predictors have 
too many different levels
9
. But, Nam et al. (2008) report the log-rank test and the Wilcoxon–
Breslow–Gehan test for their continuous predictor, which, to the best of our knowledge, is 
inappropriate. Considering this constraint, we perform univariate regression of each covariate 
in turn, for an initial insight into their effects on respective default events.  
In order to narrow down our list of covariates, at first we obtain univariate regression 
estimates using Event 2 as the dependent variable and Equation (6) as the regression 
methodology (discrete-time hazard model with logit link). Here we use the financial distress 
based definition rather than legal bankruptcy, with the presumption that it is the primary 
reason behind bankruptcy and always precedes the bankruptcy filing event. Further, filing for 
legal bankruptcy is the least efficient exit strategy for SMEs (Balcaen et al. 2012). 
Additionally, to gauge the temporal variation in the explanatory power of covariates we 
obtain regression estimates for T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3 lagged time periods (see Table 6). At 
this stage we exclude covariates from further empirical analysis that (i) are not significant in 
all three time periods (this ensures that the selected covariates are consistent predictors of 
firms’ financial health over a sufficiently long time interval to allow for developing a 
reasonable early warning system), or (ii) are significant but exhibit Average Marginal 
                                                 
8
 See Cleves et al. (2010) for a detailed description of Kaplan-Meier curves. 
9
 See for example http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/stata/seminars/stata_survival/default.htm (accessed May 18, 
2016). Also see Cleves et al. (2010) for a more thorough understanding. 
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Effects
10
 (AME) of less than 5% in all three time periods. The rationale is that a unit change 
in the value of significant covariates must induce sufficient change in the magnitude of the 
outcome probability to clearly distinguish between distressed and healthy firms.  An 
interesting observation in Table 6  is the AME of Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates that 
are widely employed in modelling default risk of SMEs. Out of the five covariates that they 
suggest, three (STDEBV, EBITDAIE and RETA) exhibit AME of less than 5% with AME of 
EBITDAIE being almost zero. The other two covariates CTA and EBITDATA have AME 
values less than 17%. This suggests that, although these covariates are significant predictors, 
a unit change in their value does not transmit significant change in the probability of outcome 
variable. Although three of Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates have AME less than 5%, 
we include them for further empirical analysis to gain greater understanding of their 
explanatory power in the multivariate setup. Furthermore, the AME of FETA and TTA are 
highest among all covariates suggesting that financial expense and tax are dominant signals 
to identify financially distressed firms. From 27 variables, this helps us to narrow down to 16 
variables that we use for further empirical analysis. Table 7 reports the final list of covariates 
that we use for further univariate and multivariate regression analysis. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Univariate Regression of Event 1: Section A of Table 8 reports the univariate regression 
estimates for Event 1 using discrete and continuous-time hazard models. Magnitude of 
coefficients of respective covariates (β in Table 8) obtained using discrete-time hazard 
specification with logit and cloglog links, and the extended Cox model, are close to each 
other with some variation for covariates TLTA, FETA, CAG, SAG, TTA and RETA. 
However, logit and cloglog estimates exhibit almost identical model fit as their AIC
11
 values 
are almost identical, but they are about three times higher for Cox estimates. This suggests 
                                                 
10
 In non-linear regression analysis, Marginal Effects are a useful way to examine the effect of changes in a 
given covariate on changes in the outcome variable, holding other covariates constant. These can be computed 
as marginal change (it is the partial derivative for continuous predictors) when a covariate changes by an 
infinitely small quantity and discrete change (for factor variables) when a covariate changes by a fixed quantity. 
Average Marginal Effects (AME) of a given covariate is the average of its marginal effects computed for each 
observation at its observed values. Alternatively, AME can be interpreted as the change in the outcome 
(financial distress = 1, in our case) probabilities due to unit change in the value of a given covariate, provided 
other covariates are held constant. See Long and Freese (2014) for detailed discussion on this topic.  
11
 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is defined as:  AIC = −2 × L + 2 × (p + 1) where L is the log-likelihood of 
the fitted model and p is the number of regression coefficients estimated for non-constant covariates. In general, 
models with lower values of AIC are preferred to larger ones. 
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that discrete-time model with logit/cloglog links offer better model fit than extended Cox 
models
12
. We also see that CAG and SAG are significant in all time periods when estimated 
using discrete hazard model, but becomes insignificant (in T – 2 and T – 3) when estimated 
using Cox model. Further, the statistical significance of TLTA, NIS and RETA also varies 
with their econometric specification. Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariate EBITDATA loses 
its statistical significance beyond T – 1; STDEBV shows unstable explanatory power (sign is 
opposite to expectation for T – 1 logit and cloglog estimates), is insignificant in T – 1 but 
significant in T – 2 and T – 3; EBITDAIE is significant but its coefficients are almost 0; 
RETA is significant in T – 1 but is insignificant in T – 2 and T – 3 when estimated using 
discrete-hazard specification. Only CTA shows consistent and reliable explanatory power in 
all three time periods across all econometric specifications. Event 1 is the same event 
definition that they use in their default prediction study, however our results do not approve 
the covariates suggested by them. Their suggestion might be biased due to their sample 
selection process, while we use near-population data to establish our empirical validation.  
Univariate Regression of Event 2: Section B of Table 8 reports univariate regression 
estimates obtained using Event 2 as a dependent variable. All covariates are significant across 
all econometric specifications for all lagged time periods. However, the AIC values of logit 
and cloglog estimates are about three to six times lower than values obtained using Cox 
specification. This asserts that discrete hazard models offer better model fit than their 
continuous counterparts. Additionally, in T – 3, FETA and WCTA fail to remain significant 
when estimated using Cox specification. In this case, all of  Altman and Sabato's (2007) 
covariates are significant with expected sign across all econometric specification for 
respective lagged time periods except RETA, for Cox estimate at T – 3. All of their covariates 
also have reasonable magnitude of respective coefficients except EBITDAIE, which is again 
almost 0. However, the real litmus test of their covariates will be performed in the 
multivariate section. 
Univariate Regression of Event 3: Section C of Table 8 reports univariate regression 
estimates obtained using Event 3 as the dependent variable. Unlike Event 2 estimates, many 
of the covariates (OPCE, NIS, CAG, STDEBV, EBITDAIE and RETA) show varying 
                                                 
12
 For most covariates and their respective time lags in Table 8, absolute values of coefficients are highest for 
logit estimates, followed by cloglog estimates, and least for Cox estimates (i.e. |logit| > |cloglog| > |Cox|). 
However, based on this it shall be inappropriate to conclude that, for a unit change in the value of a covariate 
logit estimates lead to highest change in the outcome probability than its alternative counterparts. This 
generalization may only be valid if their Average Marginal Effects (AME) or other similar estimate also show 
this pattern.   
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(insignificant) explanatory power across different time periods. Two of Altman and Sabato's 
(2007) covariates (STDEBV and EBITDAIE) also fail miserably to discriminate distressed 
and censored firms across T – 1 and T – 2 lagged time periods.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5.3 Developing Multivariate Hazard Models 
In this section, we develop and discuss multivariate hazard models for the respective default 
definitions discussed in Section 3. We begin with our choice for specification of the baseline 
hazard rate, which is required for developing discrete-time duration-dependent hazard 
models, then develop and discuss the multivariate discrete-time and continuous-time hazard 
models.  
5.3.1 Detection of Baseline Hazard Rate 
Before developing multivariate discrete-time hazard models it is important to choose a 
baseline specification for the hazard rate. Figure 1 shows the table of hazard curves
13
 
estimated using the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator for different default events (Kaplan and 
Meier 1958). KM estimator also known as product limit estimator is the most prolific and 
classic non-parametric technique of survival analysis. It is primarily used to produce useful 
visual plots of survival/life tables, survival curves and hazard curves. This KM estimator 
estimates the survival function at time 𝑡, denoted by ?̂?(𝑡), which is the probability of survival 
time being greater than 𝑡. The formula for KM survival probability at failure time 𝑡𝑗 gives the 
probability of surviving past the previous failure time 𝑡𝑗−1, multiplied by the conditional 
probability of surviving past time 𝑡𝑗, given survival to at least time 𝑡𝑗. 
?̂?(𝑡𝑗) = ?̂?(𝑡𝑗−1) × Pr⁡(𝑇 > 𝑡𝑗|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡𝑗)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(7) 
                                                 
13
 Table 1 shows that the earliest age that a firm can experience a distress event under all three default 
definitions is one year. However, the hazard curves start from somewhere around five years. This difference is 
due to the fact that the “sts graph” command in Stata performs an adjustment of the smoothed hazard near the 
boundaries. In case of the default kernel function of -sts graph- (Epanechnikov kernel), the plotting range of the 
smoothed hazard function is restricted to within one bandwidth of each endpoint. The same is true for other 
kernels, except the epan2, biweight, and rectangular kernels, in which case the adjustment is performed using 
boundary kernels.  If we wish to plot an estimate of the hazard for the entire range, we could use a kernel 
without a boundary correction. Alternatively, we can use the -noboundary- option, but this will produce an 
estimate that is biased near the edges. See “help sts graph” in Stata and Silverman (1986) for further details. 
This will not affect the empirical analysis if one uses a fully non-parametric method of baseline hazard 
specification. However, one needs to be careful while using piecewise-constant specification. 
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As shown below, Equation (7) can also be written as product limit of the survivor function if 
we substitute for survival probabilities ?̂?(𝑡𝑗−1) with the product of all fractions that estimate 
the conditional probabilities for failure time 𝑡𝑗−1 and earlier. 
?̂?(𝑡𝑗) = ∏Pr⁡(
𝑗−1
𝑖=1
𝑇 > 𝑡𝑖|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡𝑖)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(8) 
Comparison of survival curves is useful when comparison is made between survival patterns 
of two or more categories. In our case, we do not have the same event for multiple categories, 
but multiple events for the same category or sample. Thus, analysis of hazard rate/curves that 
use information from Equation (8), and as stated in Equation (2) is more relevant in this 
context. This also helps us in defining baseline hazard rate of multivariate models. 
As reported in Figure 1, hazard curves of all three events exhibit fairly different functional 
relationships with firms’ age. The hazard curves of all three events show increasing and 
decreasing relationships with firms’ age, and the shape of hazard curves of Event 1 and Event 
3 are quite similar. From the surface it might seem that the default events are highly duration-
dependent. However, one might turn sceptic after looking at the magnitude of hazard rates on 
the vertical axis. For Event 1 it ranges approximately between 0.006 and 0.013; Event 2 
between 0.05 and 0.13; and Event 3 between 0.00175 and 0.00325. Considering these tight 
intervals of hazard rates, piece-wise specification of baseline hazards might fail to reflect the 
differences in the hazard rates between respective age groups.  Additionally, all three hazard 
curves show steep rises and falls with some flatness in a couple of time intervals, thus it is 
inappropriate to assume that the hazard rates are constant for any defined age group. In this 
situation it may be appropriate to use a fully non-parametric baseline hazard specification, 
thus age specific dummy variables to specify the baseline hazard rate. To statistically test our 
intuition, we estimated multivariate discrete hazard models (with logit link) with Event 1, 
Event 2 and Event 3 respectively as dependent variables and only age dummies as 
independent variables. Regression results
14
 confirm that about 90% of age dummies are 
significant (p-value < 0.05) in explaining respective outcome of interest. However, when 
supplemented with financial covariates, only about 10% of age dummies remain statistically 
significant with large values of standard errors of their coefficients. This suggests that in 
presence of financial covariates, temporal dummies fail to capture duration dependence of 
                                                 
14
 These results are not reported in this paper; however, it may be made available from the authors. 
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hazard rates.  Additionally, one also needs to consider that too many variables may make the 
multivariate model numerically unstable. Thus, following Shumway (2001) we re-estimate 
these models using the natural logarithm of firms’ annual age (variable AGE in Table 9) as 
the baseline hazard specification. In contrast to Shumway's (2001) results, variable AGE is 
significant in most of our multivariate hazard models. In light of this discussion we use the 
natural logarithm of firms’ age (AGE) to proxy the baseline hazard rate for all our 
multivariate models developed. 
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
5.3.2 Model-Building Strategy 
The criteria for including a covariate in the multivariate model often vary across scientific 
disciplines, but they all strive to develop the ‘best’ model that is numerically stable and can 
be easily adapted for real life applications. The standard error of a model increases with the 
increase in the number of covariates, and this also makes the model more dependent on the 
observed data. Thus the objective should be to employ a minimum number of covariates for a 
desired accuracy level. A good start is to perform univariate regressions of each covariate in 
turn, and consider covariates with p-values of less than 0.25 for developing multivariate 
models (see chapter 4 of Hosmer Jr et al. 2013).  Another school of thought suggests 
inclusion of all theoretically motivated covariates in the multivariate model irrespective of 
their significance level in the univariate analysis. Some studies exclude insignificant 
predictors (p-value > 0.05) from their multivariate models, yet insignificant predictors may 
explain some of the variation of the dependent variable. Multicollinearity can be a serious 
issue that may make the model unstable if not addressed effectively. Thus, at first we rank  
the covariates in Table 7 based on the magnitude of their AME (the covariate with the highest 
value of |AME| is ranked 1, and so on) and then introduce each covariate in turn into the 
multivariate setup, starting with the covariate with the highest ranking (rank = 1 in Table 7). 
The rationale is that the higher the value of AME, the higher the change in the predicted 
probability due to unit changes in the covariate’s value. Thus a covariate with a higher value 
of AME (e.g. FETA in Table 7) is more efficient in discriminating between distressed and 
censored firms than a covariate with lower value of AME (e.g. TLTA in Table 7). 
Furthermore, we exclude a covariate from the multivariate model if, when introduced: (i) it 
affects the sign
15
 of any previously added covariate; (ii) it bears the opposite sign to that 
                                                 
15
 Coefficients with a negative sign become positive and vice versa.  
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expected; (iii) it bears the expected sign but has a p-value greater than 0.25; and (iv) it makes 
a previously added covariate insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.25. These scenarios 
may primarily arise due to multicollinearity among covariates, thus our screening mechanism 
seems to be a reasonable choice. Moreover, we believe that this method of covariate 
introduction while developing multivariate models reasonably addresses the multicollinearity 
problem, and leaves us with a ‘best’ set of covariates that explain the variance of the 
dependent variable. Using the discrete hazard model with logit link, this process is applied to 
Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 respectively for all three (T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3) respective 
lagged time periods. Then, multivariate hazard models with cloglog link and extended Cox 
are estimated using the same set of covariates selected using logit link to see any differences 
that may arise due to different estimation methods. 
The final set of multivariate hazard models reported in Table 9 are estimated using all 
observations available to us covering the entire sampling period, thus we do not have separate 
test and hold-out samples. In order to assess within-sample classification performance of the 
models developed we estimate area under ROC (AUROC) curves for respective models using 
the full estimation sample. For out-of-sample validation, we first estimate multivariate hazard 
models using observations until the year 2011, and using these estimates we predict the 
default probabilities for the year 2012; we then include 2012 in the estimation sample and 
predict default probabilities for 2013 and so on, until the year 2015. We then use these 
predicted probabilities from the year 2012 through 2015 to estimate out-of-sample AUROC 
for respective multivariate hazard models.   
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
5.3.3 Hazard Models for Event 1 
The binary dependent variable used is Event 1, i.e. firms that filed for legal bankruptcy 
proceedings and are therefore considered to have experienced the default event and censored 
otherwise (please see Section 3 for detailed discussion). Section A of Table 9 reports 
multivariate hazard models estimated for T – 1, T – 2 and T – 3 lagged time periods 
developed using respective econometric specification. As we can see, the logit estimates of 
factors affecting the outcome probability of Event 1 vary considerably across time periods, 
except FETA. However, the control variables Micro, Small, RISK1 and AGE are strongly 
significant across all time periods. Among of five Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates, 
EBITDATA and RETA fail to find a place in our multivariate models for all three time 
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periods. Additionally, STDEBV, CTA and EBITDAIE do not show consistency in their 
explanatory power. As seen in univariate regression, here too the coefficients of EBITDAIE 
are almost 0. This clearly shows the inefficiency of  Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariate in 
predicting corporate bankruptcies for SMEs. The statistical significance of most of the 
covariates does not vary considerably when estimated using cloglog and Cox specifications 
except STDEBV, CAG and SAG. However, AIC values of logit and cloglog estimates are 
almost identical and are about half that of Cox estimates. This clearly suggests that discrete-
time hazard models offer much superior model fit than the continuous extended Cox model. 
However, the within-sample AUROC for all econometric specifications are almost identical, 
with slight variation among estimates of the hold-out sample (see Figure 2). This suggests no 
significant loss in the classification performance if one uses Cox specification over discrete-
time. Additionally, the AUROC of all our multivariate models developed are around 0.8 or 
higher, which is considered to be excellent. However, shapes of ROC curves of hold-out 
sample estimates are steps rather than concave due to very low number of outcome events in 
out-of-sample validation
16
.  
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
5.3.4 Hazard Models for Event 2 
Unlike Event 1, multivariate models developed for Event 2 using logit specification show 
consistent explanatory power of most covariates over all three lagged time periods (see 
Section B of Table 9). However, the statistical significance of SAG (T – 1) and AGE (T – 1 
and T – 3) varies with the estimation technique. All control variables (Small, Medium and 
RISK2) are also highly significant across all lagged time periods. Among Altman and 
Sabato's (2007) covariates, STDEBV, EBITDATA and EBITDAIE exhibit significant 
explanatory power across all lagged time periods and econometric specifications. However, 
the coefficient of EBITDAIE is almost 0 here as well. The variable CTA finds place only in 
the models developed for T – 2 time periods, while RETA fails to meet our screening criteria 
for inclusion in the multivariate model. Thus, Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates are not 
efficient predictors of financial distress, unlike some of the other financial ratios reported in 
Section B of Table 9. Here too the AIC values of discrete hazard models are about three to 
four times lower than Cox models, thus discrete-time hazard models offer a superior model 
fit compared with their continuous counterpart. The within sample and hold-out sample 
                                                 
16
 This might result in misleading estimates of AUROC. Thus one needs to be careful when drawing inferences 
regarding out-of-sample predictive ability of the forecasting model. 
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AUROC estimated for different multivariate models are around, or higher than, 0.80, 
suggesting excellent classification performance of our multivariate models across all time 
periods and econometric specifications (see Figure 2). 
5.3.5 Hazard Models for Event 3 
The final set of hazard models that we estimate is based on the default definition (Event 3) 
that we propose in this study, which considers both legal bankruptcy filing and firms’ 
financial health while classifying SMEs as default (please see Section 3 for details). Section 
C of Table 9 reports multivariate regression estimates for Event 3 across all three lagged time 
periods and respective econometric specifications. A look at the results reveals that factors 
affecting outcome probability vary reasonably across time periods. Even the statistical 
significance of six covariates (STDEBV, OPCE, RETA, CAG, SAG and TTA) is sensitive to 
estimation technique. Among Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates STDEBV finds place in 
T – 2 and T – 3, while RETA finds a place in T – 1 only. EBITDATA, CTA and EBITDAIE 
fail to meet our inclusion criteria into the multivariate setup. This reinforces the inefficiency 
of covariates suggested by Altman and Sabato (2007) in predicting SMEs financial distress. 
Here too the AIC values are in favour of discrete-time models, which are about 0.8 times 
lower than continuous Cox estimates. Both within sample and hold-out sample classification 
of all multivariate models across all time periods and econometric specifications are close to 
or above 0.9, which is superior to Event 1 and Event 2 models’ classification performance 
(see Figure 2). 
5.3.6 Comparative Performance of Hazard Models 
As reported in Table 9, the extended Cox model performs almost identically to discrete-time 
models with logit and clog-log links as it shows almost identical classification performance 
across all default definitions. Thus one might be indifferent in her choice of hazard 
specification. But, if the event of interest is not duration dependent (i.e. some functional form 
of time or time dummies are not significant in the multivariate model), with the hazard rates 
being invariant or varying mildly across different time periods, then getting involved in the 
complications of hazard models is not rewarding considering the marginal gain one would 
obtain using such models. As reported earlier, in the presence of other financial covariates 
about 90% of time dummies that we use as baseline hazard specification are insignificant, 
with very high values of standard errors. Thus we use natural logarithm of firms’ annual age 
as baseline hazard specification. However, such objective can easily be achieved by 
developing regression models using a panel logistic regression technique that uses some 
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functional form of time to capture any duration dependency. Although Shumway (2001) 
argues that hazard models are superior to competing static models but AGE variables in his 
multivariate models are insignificant, how can it be used to reliably predict duration specific 
hazard rate, which is why hazard models are primarily used? Unlike other scientific 
disciplines such as medicine or health economics, duration specific prediction of hazard rates 
is not a common practice in bankruptcy/financial distress prediction studies, thus we do not 
see any real need for hazard models if similar objective can be achieved using much simpler 
logistic regression that controls for any duration dependencies, as both involve identical 
statistical estimation methods. Another interesting observation is the classification 
performance measures across different default definitions. Based on the AUROC measures, 
Event 1 is the weakest definition of default while Event 3 is the strongest, as it has the highest 
values of AUROC across all time periods. Also, the AIC measure of Event 3 models is the 
lowest among the three default definitions, which indicates that the Event 3 default definition 
provides a vastly improved fit compared to other two competing default definitions.   
6. Conclusion 
The use of hazard models in estimating bankruptcy prediction is gathering momentum in 
financial academic literature. Unfortunately, the vast majority of previous studies suffer from 
at least one of the following shortcomings: (i) insufficient reasoning behind their choice of 
discrete-time or continuous-time hazard models; (ii) inappropriate specification of baseline 
hazard rate; (iii) no test of proportional hazards assumption when using the extended Cox 
model with time-independent covariates; (iv) ignores frailty and recurrent events; or (v) 
insufficient explanation of how they dealt with the issues of delayed entry.  
We contribute to the literature by acknowledging all of these commonly neglected concerns 
in our research. To our knowledge we are the first academic paper to report a performance 
comparison of popular hazard models (discrete hazard models with logit and clog-log links 
and the extended Cox models) used in the recent literature (e.g. Campbell et al. 2008; Chen 
and Hill 2013). We also contribute to the literature by undertaking an empirical investigation 
which compares various default definitions of the US SMEs. Three default definitions that we 
compare are based on legal bankruptcy laws (Event 1), firms’ financial health (Event 2), and 
the third definition (Event 3) proposed in this study that considers both legal bankruptcy and 
firms’ financial health. Considering the suggestion of Hosmer Jr et al. (2013) on multivariate 
model building strategy, we propose an atheoretical econometric based multivariate model 
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building strategy based on covariates’ Average Marginal Effects (AME) and their inter-
temporal discrimination ability. Finally, we further contribute to the field by examining the 
efficiency of covariates, suggested by the most popular study on SMEs’ bankruptcy by 
Altman and Sabato (2007), in predicting SMEs bankruptcy across varying default definitions 
and lagged time periods. 
Our findings show almost identical classification performance of both discrete-time and 
continuous-time hazard model across all three default definitions, suggesting insignificant 
variance of classification performance to econometric specification. Based on comparison of 
AIC measures, discrete-time hazard models provide considerably superior fit than 
continuous-time Cox models. However, AIC measures for both discrete-time hazard models 
(logit and clog-log links) are almost identical; hence the choice between them is left to the 
personal preference of the users. Also, Altman and Sabato's (2007) covariates are unstable 
and inefficient in predicting event outcome across different default definitions and lagged 
time periods in comparison to other competing financial ratios. Furthermore, based on the 
classification performance and AIC values of models developed using different default 
definitions, we understand that the default definition that we propose performs best in 
identifying distressed firms.  
Given the importance of hazard models in predicting bankruptcy, and the robustness of our 
results in dealing with neglected econometric issues in most previous empirical research in 
bankruptcy related survival analysis, we believe this paper makes a significant contribution to 
SMEs and corporate failure literature.     
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Table 1: Survival Table 
Age Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
1 0 % 1 1 0 % 1 1 0 % 1 
1 8 3,931 0.20 316 3,623 8.02 2 3,937 0.05 
2 13 6,373 0.20 0 6,386 0.00 1 6,385 0.02 
3 28 6,749 0.41 607 6,170 8.96 1 6,776 0.01 
4 41 6,412 0.64 894 5,559 13.85 6 6,447 0.09 
5 52 6,242 0.83 831 5,463 13.20 12 6,282 0.19 
6 47 5,791 0.81 910 4,928 15.59 12 5,826 0.21 
7 56 4,941 1.12 812 4,185 16.25 16 4,981 0.32 
8 48 4,277 1.11 716 3,609 16.55 20 4,305 0.46 
9 54 3,776 1.41 697 3,133 18.20 17 3,813 0.45 
10 50 3,283 1.50 618 2,715 18.54 14 3,319 0.42 
11 35 2,564 1.35 476 2,123 18.31 11 2,588 0.43 
12 25 2,233 1.11 371 1,887 16.43 11 2,247 0.49 
13 24 2,039 1.16 358 1,705 17.35 6 2,057 0.29 
14 19 1,817 1.03 323 1,513 17.59 5 1,831 0.27 
15 15 1,625 0.91 273 1,367 16.65 6 1,634 0.37 
16 10 1,460 0.68 248 1,222 16.87 3 1,467 0.20 
17 11 1,285 0.85 224 1,072 17.28 2 1,294 0.15 
18 7 1,128 0.62 195 940 17.18 3 1,132 0.27 
19 8 1,017 0.78 199 826 19.41 3 1,022 0.29 
20 12 900 1.32 157 755 17.21 4 908 0.44 
21 10 786 1.26 132 664 16.58 1 795 0.13 
22 6 715 0.83 123 598 17.06 0 721 0.00 
23 6 642 0.93 111 537 17.13 1 647 0.15 
24 6 573 1.04 107 472 18.48 0 579 0.00 
25 9 483 1.83 95 397 19.31 3 489 0.61 
26 10 445 2.20 93 362 20.44 3 452 0.66 
27 6 411 1.44 74 343 17.75 5 412 1.21 
28 4 379 1.04 62 321 16.19 0 383 0.00 
29 4 329 1.20 62 271 18.62 1 332 0.30 
30 5 271 1.81 50 226 18.12 2 274 0.73 
31 5 235 2.08 41 199 17.08 1 239 0.42 
32 5 201 2.43 38 168 18.45 1 205 0.49 
33 4 178 2.20 23 159 12.64 1 181 0.55 
34 4 163 2.40 20 147 11.98 1 166 0.60 
35 4 145 2.68 15 134 10.07 0 149 0.00 
36 3 127 2.31 16 114 12.31 0 130 0.00 
37 2 115 1.71 16 101 13.68 1 116 0.86 
38 1 111 0.89 11 101 9.82 0 112 0.00 
39 0 102 0.00 13 89 12.75 0 102 0.00 
40 0 91 0.00 9 82 9.89 0 91 0.00 
41 1 69 1.43 6 64 8.57 0 70 0.00 
42 0 45 0.00 0 45 0.00 0 45 0.00 
43 0 46 0.00 3 43 6.52 0 46 0.00 
44 0 41 0.00 3 38 7.32 0 41 0.00 
45 0 36 0.00 2 34 5.56 0 36 0.00 
46 0 30 0.00 3 27 10.00 0 30 0.00 
47 0 27 0.00 2 25 7.41 0 27 0.00 
48 0 23 0.00 0 23 0.00 0 23 0.00 
49 0 23 0.00 1 22 4.35 0 23 0.00 
50 0 20 0.00 1 19 5.00 0 20 0.00 
51 0 19 0.00 1 18 5.26 0 19 0.00 
52 0 14 0.00 2 12 14.29 0 14 0.00 
53 0 11 0.00 0 11 0.00 0 11 0.00 
54 0 8 0.00 0 8 0.00 0 8 0.00 
55 0 6 0.00 1 5 16.67 0 6 0.00 
56 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
57 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
58 0 1 0.00 0 1 0.00 0 1 0.00 
Notes: This table shows the age wise distribution of firm-year observations for respective default events discussed in Section 
3. Numeric ‘0’ signifies censorship and ‘1’ signifies that a firm has experienced the respective default event.  
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Table 2: Sample Industrial Classification 
Industry Code SIC Code Industry Included/Excluded 
1 < 1000 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing Included 
2 1000 to < 1500 Mining Included 
3 1500 to < 1800 Construction Included 
4 2000 to < 4000 Manufacturing Included 
5 5000 to < 5200 Wholesale Trade Included 
6 5200 to < 6000 Retail Trade Included 
7 7000 to < 8900 Services Included 
Excluded 4000 to < 5000 Transportation, Communications & Public Utilities Excluded 
Excluded 6000 to < 6800 Finance, Insurance & Real Estate Excluded 
Excluded 9100 to < 10000 Public Administration Excluded 
Notes: This table reports Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of US firms. SIC Code is a four digit code that represents 
given industrial sectors. The last column reports the industrial sectors that we included or excluded from our sample.  
 
 
  Table 3: List of Covariates 
Category Variable Definition Compustat Data Item 
Leverage STDEBV Short term debt/equity book value DLC/SEQ 
 TLTA Total liabilities/tangible total assets  LT/(AT – INTAN) 
 TLNW Total liabilities/net worth LT/(AT - LT) 
 CETL Capital employed/total liabilities (AT – LCT)/LT 
    
Liquidity CTA Cash and short-term investments/total assets CHE/AT 
 CR Current Ratio; current assets/current liabilities ACT/LCT 
 
QR 
Quick Ratio; (current assets – stocks - prepayments)/current 
liabilities 
(ACT – INVT – 
XPP)/LCT 
 
CHR 
Cash Ratio; (cash + bank + marketable securities)/current 
liabilities 
CHE/LCT 
    
Financing FETA Financial expenses/total assets XINT/AT 
 FES Financial expenses/sales XINT/SALE 
 RETA Retained earnings/total assets RE/AT 
 
EBITDAIE 
Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and 
amortization/interest expense 
EBITDA/XINT 
    
Profitability 
EBITDATA 
Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and 
amortization/total assets 
EBITDA/AT 
 OPCE Operating profit/capital employed EBIT/(AT - LCT) 
 ROE Return on equity; Net profit/equity NI/SEQ 
 NIS Net income/sales NI/SALE 
 OPNI Operating profit/net income EBIT/NI 
    
Activity SHP Stock holding period; (stock × 365)/sales (INVT × 365)/SALE 
 DCP Debtor collection period; (trade debtors × 365)/sales (RECTR × 365)/SALE 
 TCP Trade creditors payment period; (trade creditors × 365)/sales (AP × 365)/SALE 
 WCTA Working capital/total assets WCAP/AT 
 WCS Working capital/sales WCAP/SALE 
 STA Sales/tangible assets SALE/(AT – INTAN) 
    
Growth CAG Capital growth; calculated as (Capitalt / Capitalt-1) - 1 (AT - LCT) 
 SAG Sales growth; calculated as (Salet / Salet-1) - 1 SALE 
 ERG Earnings growth; calculated as (EBITt / EBITt-1) - 1 EBIT 
    
Other TTA Income taxes/total assets TXT/AT 
    
Control Micro No. of employees < 10  
 Small 10 =<  No. of employees < 50  
 
RISK 
Event rate in a given industrial sector in a given year 
(calculated separately for different Event definition) 
 
Notes: This table lists the set of covariates, along with their respective definition, that we use for the empirical analysis. The 
last column lists the specific Compustat data items that we use to calculate the financial covariates.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Status 
Indicator 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
STDEBV 0 0.1889 0.0144 0.4235 0.1843 0.0176 0.3977 0.1893 0.0143 0.4245 
 1 0.1967 0.0000 0.5262 0.2163 0.0000 0.5558 0.0442 -0.0571 0.4291 
OPNI 0 1.1200 1.0058 1.0524 1.1707 1.0338 1.0748 1.1177 1.0050 1.0533 
 1 0.6870 0.6729 1.0861 0.7976 0.8270 0.8516 0.5416 0.4644 0.9635 
TLTA 0 0.6390 0.4978 0.5124 0.5481 0.4325 0.4430 0.6404 0.4993 0.5130 
 1 0.9685 0.8343 0.5879 1.1870 1.0742 0.5578 1.2802 1.3848 0.5885 
TLNW 0 1.0663 0.4885 2.4897 1.0672 0.4964 2.2490 1.0681 0.4890 2.4963 
 1 1.0459 0.3762 3.3770 1.0595 0.1858 3.6364 0.2452 -1.1327 3.4305 
CETL 0 2.5593 1.5343 2.5867 2.8603 1.8361 2.6255 2.5520 1.5274 2.5852 
 1 1.1824 0.5146 1.8534 0.7110 0.3667 1.2149 0.6954 0.1984 1.2239 
CTA 0 0.2346 0.1357 0.2351 0.2425 0.1475 0.2362 0.2343 0.1352 0.2352 
 1 0.1856 0.0660 0.2335 0.1853 0.0747 0.2230 0.1681 0.0578 0.2272 
CR 0 2.8370 1.9516 2.4008 3.0807 2.2228 2.4266 2.8311 1.9443 2.4002 
 1 1.6869 0.9452 1.9695 1.3366 0.8283 1.5489 1.3542 0.6025 1.6870 
QR 0 2.1085 1.2028 2.1818 2.3227 1.3980 2.2275 2.1027 1.1982 2.1804 
 1 1.1411 0.4881 1.6776 0.8220 0.3966 1.2752 0.9004 0.3045 1.4141 
CHR 0 1.4273 0.4502 1.9092 1.5658 0.5720 1.9647 1.4240 0.4478 1.9081 
 1 0.8188 0.0984 1.5851 0.5769 0.0900 1.2250 0.6384 0.0572 1.4420 
FETA 0 0.0294 0.0172 0.0324 0.0244 0.0136 0.0285 0.0295 0.0173 0.0324 
 1 0.0507 0.0474 0.0381 0.0583 0.0591 0.0375 0.0602 0.0689 0.0402 
FES 0 0.0611 0.0192 0.0953 0.0509 0.0157 0.0854 0.0613 0.0193 0.0954 
 1 0.0982 0.0510 0.1087 0.1227 0.0624 0.1237 0.1235 0.0608 0.1222 
EBITDAIE 0 99.092 -0.0423 537.480 120.948 1.2368 576.057 98.612 -0.0524 536.500 
 1 22.388 -0.7447 333.325 -24.179 -3.723 166.108 20.568 -0.6260 312.090 
EBITDATA 0 -0.2248 -0.0043 0.6142 -0.1498 0.0266 0.5294 -0.2250 -0.0045 0.6141 
 1 -0.3060 -0.0438 0.6628 -0.6531 -0.2799 0.8446 -0.4394 -0.0765 0.7822 
OPCE 0 -0.1001 -0.0052 0.4090 -0.0905 0.0025 0.3881 -0.1003 -0.0057 0.4091 
 1 -0.1207 -0.0373 0.4296 -0.1573 -0.1130 0.5120 -0.0597 -0.0003 0.4276 
ROE 0 -0.1204 0.0105 0.5801 -0.1293 0.0080 0.5361 -0.1202 0.0104 0.5809 
 1 -0.0163 0.0411 0.6791 -0.0624 0.0754 0.7918 0.1536 0.1829 0.6011 
NIS 0 -0.4445 -0.0374 0.7868 -0.3881 -0.0069 0.7603 -0.4451 -0.0382 0.7866 
 1 -0.5511 -0.2287 0.7520 -0.7995 -0.4063 0.8510 -0.5537 -0.2568 0.7432 
RETA 0 -1.5313 -0.4904 2.2310 -1.2142 -0.3045 2.0203 -1.5314 -0.4929 2.2298 
 1 -2.0233 -1.0498 2.2862 -3.3941 -3.1440 2.4774 -3.2022 -2.7933 2.4772 
SHP 0 50.132 35.532 51.986 49.777 35.764 51.378 50.134 35.536 51.986 
 1 49.579 31.523 52.770 52.287 33.687 55.590 46.837 22.446 54.655 
DCP 0 63.907 55.077 49.284 64.987 56.112 48.985 63.873 55.017 49.304 
 1 59.123 46.274 53.136 57.293 47.770 50.741 60.949 49.949 55.460 
TCP 0 168.668 35.971 532.046 146.338 33.444 485.965 168.499 35.982 531.456 
 1 187.043 40.940 558.262 306.849 58.592 742.050 308.623 50.766 801.227 
WCTA 0 0.2370 0.2774 0.3594 0.2857 0.3245 0.3327 0.2357 0.2760 0.3598 
 1 -0.0152 -0.0288 0.3790 -0.0645 -0.0845 0.3707 -0.1111 -0.2199 0.3810 
WCS 0 0.4157 0.2371 0.6494 0.4689 0.2735 0.6404 0.4140 0.2357 0.6496 
 1 0.0812 -0.0269 0.5831 0.0657 -0.0388 0.5965 -0.0504 -0.1886 0.4929 
STA 0 1.0735 0.8915 0.9189 1.0633 0.8915 0.8993 1.0737 0.8912 0.9192 
 1 1.1171 0.8864 0.9830 1.1347 0.8914 1.0262 1.1383 0.9604 1.0089 
CAG 0 0.1639 0.0292 0.6464 0.1924 0.0469 0.6229 0.1621 0.0283 0.6465 
 1 -0.0889 -0.2126 0.6427 0.0053 -0.2042 0.7368 -0.0191 -0.1314 0.7247 
SAG 0 0.1788 0.0815 0.4423 0.1906 0.0955 0.4327 0.1776 0.0804 0.4424 
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 1 -0.0170 -0.1309 0.4161 0.1033 -0.0326 0.4852 -0.0466 -0.1897 0.4138 
ERG 0 -0.0394 -0.0681 1.3143 -0.0439 -0.0420 1.3478 -0.0407 -0.0695 1.3150 
 1 -0.2671 -0.3645 1.3192 -0.0295 -0.1764 1.1325 -0.3475 -0.4978 1.1091 
TTA 0 0.0130 0.0000 0.0282 0.0148 0.0000 0.0296 0.0130 0.0000 0.0282 
 1 0.0061 0.0000 0.0222 0.0020 0.0000 0.0140 0.0037 0.0000 0.0167 
Notes: This table reports mean, median and standard deviation for healthy (censored; status indicator = 0) and unhealthy 
(firms which experienced default event; status indicator = 1) groups of firms for respective covariates under different 
definitions of default events as discussed in Section 3.  
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
STDEBV 1 1        
TLTA 2 0.0780 1       
CETL 3 -0.2986 -0.6772 1      
CTA 4 -0.2670 -0.3276 0.4829 1     
FETA 5 0.1943 0.7093 -0.5344 -0.3343 1    
FES 6 0.0084 0.4339 -0.2462 -0.0563 0.6230 1   
EBITDAIE 7 -0.1004 -0.1983 0.2729 0.1330 -0.2071 -0.1508 1  
EBITDATA 8 0.1278 -0.4223 0.1548 -0.1694 -0.2899 -0.3963 0.2129 1 
OPCE 9 -0.1097 0.0783 -0.0390 -0.2278 0.0482 -0.1084 0.2402 0.3127 
NIS 10 0.1112 -0.2128 -0.0345 -0.2941 -0.172 -0.5105 0.2517 0.6920 
RETA 11 0.1292 -0.5031 0.2299 -0.1590 -0.3409 -0.3353 0.1872 0.6588 
WCTA 12 -0.1851 -0.7413 0.5870 0.5451 -0.5782 -0.4074 0.1994 0.3148 
WCS 13 -0.2144 -0.5619 0.6392 0.7005 -0.4397 -0.1252 0.0593 0.0360 
CAG 14 -0.0992 -0.1505 0.1613 0.1336 -0.1323 -0.0293 0.0540 0.1490 
SAG 15 -0.0117 -0.0651 0.0448 0.0833 -0.0868 -0.0430 0.0225 0.0375 
TTA 16 -0.0680 -0.1870 0.0894 -0.0085 -0.1813 -0.2153 0.2993 0.3199 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
OPCE 9 1        
NIS 10 0.4705 1       
RETA 11 0.3057 0.5371 1      
WCTA 12 -0.0633 0.1543 0.3499 1     
WCS 13 -0.2574 -0.2318 0.1047 0.7403 1    
CAG 14 0.2161 0.0921 0.1658 0.1969 0.1783 1   
SAG 15 0.0424 0.0061 0.0497 0.0554 0.0676 0.2730 1  
TTA 16 0.4175 0.3232 0.2985 0.2158 -0.0259 0.1345 0.0971 1 
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Table 6: Event 2 Univariate Regression 
Variable Sign 
T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
β SE AME % β SE AME % β SE AME  % 
STDEBV      + 0.1700a 0.0298 1.05a 0.3928a 0.0312 2.84a 0.3225a 0.0329 2.72a 
OPNI            - -0.3627a 0.0147 -2.32a -0.3323a 0.0150 -2.48a -0.1608a 0.0146 -1.36a 
TLTA           + 2.4762a a 0.0332 16.59 a 2.2925a 0.0340 17.77a 0.6454a 0.0317 5.78a 
TLNW          + 0.0096b 0.0048 0.05b 0.0349a 0.0050 0.25a 0.0294a 0.0053 0.24a 
CETL           - -0.9832a 0.0175 -7.60a -0.8332a 0.0155 -7.20a -0.2073a 0.0076 -1.87a 
CTA              - -1.9079a 0.0753 -11.67a -2.2780a 0.0882 -16.20a -0.5436a 0.0770 -4.55a 
CR                 - -0.5862a 0.0113 -4.09a -0.5718a 0.0113 -4.60a -0.1559a 0.0077 -1.35a 
QR                 - -0.6774a 0.0179 -4.69a -0.6328a 0.0171 -4.86a -0.1790a 0.0113 -1.51a 
CHR              - -0.5532a 0.0132 -3.55a -0.5760a 0.0138 -4.30a -0.1436a 0.0098 -1.22a 
FETA            + 32.1570a 0.4631 248.01a 24.0993a 0.4610 219.22a 8.8175a 0.4786 84.55a 
FES               + 7.2175a 0.1558 50.52a 6.3882a 0.1665 51.69a 3.7784a 0.1733 33.55a 
EBITDAIE   - -0.0007a 0.0000 -0.00a -0.0020a 0.0001 -0.02a -0.0014a 0.0000 -0.01a 
EBITDATA  - -1.0990a 0.0233 -7.98a -1.5416a 0.0289 -11.39a -0.8150a 0.0276 -7.22a 
OPCE           - -0.1528a 0.0320 -0.94a -1.0082a 0.0351 -7.50a -1.1616a 0.0373 -9.96a 
ROE             - 0.2635a 0.0210 1.64a -0.2591a 0.0219 -1.90a -0.5588a 0.0238 -4.75a 
NIS               - -0.5768a 0.0200 -3.66a -1.0970a 0.0237 -7.89a -0.7226a 0.0229 -5.97a 
RETA           - -0.4931a 0.0078 -3.68a -0.4340a 0.0079 -3.76a -0.1911a 0.0077 -1.81a 
SHP              + -0.0002 0.0000 -0.00 0.0034a 0.0003 0.02a 0.0048a 0.0003 0.04a 
DCP             + -0.0039a 0.0003 -0.02a -0.0023a 0.0003 -0.02a 0.0005 0.0003 0.00 
TCP              + 0.0003a 0.0000 0.00a 0.0003a 0.0000 0.00a 0.001a 0.0000 0.00a 
WCTA          - -3.2430a 0.0500 -22.62a -3.1762a 0.0517 -25.47a -0.8462a 0.0462 -7.44a 
WCS             - -1.5370a 0.0335 -9.60a -1.4041a 0.0336 -10.04a -0.1892a 0.0276 -1.50a 
STA              + 0.2387a 0.0184 1.44a 0.0406b 0.0199 0.28b -0.2551a 0.0215 -2.10a 
CAG             - -0.4236a 0.0210 -3.12a -1.1145a 0.0271 -9.68a -0.4648a 0.0240 -3.78a 
SAG              - -0.4975a 0.0321 -3.42a -0.8480 0.0351 -6.76a -0.3526a 0.0356 -2.70a 
ERG              - -0.0145 0.0104 -0.10 -0.0009 0.0108 -0.00 -0.0331a 0.0116 -0.26a 
TTA              - -24.5294a 0.8286 -166.40a -46.0535a 1.2150 -370.58a -28.3887a 0.9206 -255.68a 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports univariate regression 
estimates of respective covariates at respective lagged time periods, estimated using a discrete-time hazard 
model with logit link and Event 2 = 1 as outcome event. ‘Sign’ represents expected sign of regression 
coefficients, β is the regression coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in 
percentage.  
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Table 7: Final Set of Covariates 
Variable Sign 
T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
β Rank   AME % β Rank AME % β Rank AME % 
STDEBV + 0.1700a 14 1.05a 0.3928a 15 2.84a 0.3225a 11 2.72a 
TLTA + 2.4762a  5 16.59 a 2.2925a 5 17.77a 0.6454a 8 5.78a 
CETL - -0.9832a 9 -7.60a -0.8332a 12 -7.20a -0.2073a 13 -1.87a 
CTA - -1.9079a 6 -11.67a -2.2780a 6 -16.20a -0.5436a 9 -4.55a 
FETA + 32.1570a 1 248.01a 24.0993a 2 219.22a 8.8175a 2 84.55a 
FES + 7.2175a 3 50.52a 6.3882a 3 51.69a 3.7784a 3 33.55a 
EBITDAIE - -0.0007a 16 -0.00a -0.0020a 16 -0.02a -0.0014a 16 -0.01a 
EBITDATA - -1.0990a 8 -7.98a -1.5416a 7 -11.39a -0.8150a 6 -7.22a 
OPCE - -0.1528a 15 -0.94a -1.0082a 11 -7.50a -1.1616a 4 -9.96a 
NIS - -0.5768a 11 -3.66a -1.0970a 10 -7.89a -0.7226a 7 -5.97a 
RETA - -0.4931a 10 -3.68a -0.4340a 14 -3.76a -0.1911a 14 -1.81a 
WCTA - -3.2430a 4 -22.62a -3.1762a 4 -25.47a -0.8462a 5 -7.44a 
WCS - -1.5370a 7 -9.60a -1.4041a 8 -10.04a -0.1892a 15 -1.50a 
CAG - -0.4236a 13 -3.12a -1.1145a 9 -9.68a -0.4648a 10 -3.78a 
SAG - -0.4975a 12 -3.42a -0.8480 13 -6.76a -0.3526a 12 -2.70a 
TTA - -24.5294a 2 -166.40a -46.0535a 1 -370.58a -28.3887a 1 -255.68a 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports the final set of 
covariates that we use for multivariate hazard analysis. This excludes covariates reported in Table 6 that are not 
significant in all three time periods or are significant but exhibit Average Marginal Effects (AME) of less than 
5% in all three time periods. It also includes all covariates of Altman and Sabato’s (2007) study irrespective of 
their significance or AME values. ‘Sign’ represents expected sign of regression coefficients, β is the regression 
coefficient, SE is standard error and AME is Average Marginal Effects in percentage. Rank is based on the 
absolute values of AME, where highest value gets 1, second highest get 2 and so on. 
 
 
Table 8: Univariate Regression 
Section A: Event 1  
Variable 
logit clog-log Cox 
T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
TLTA          
β 1.6496a 0.9402a 0.5690a 1.4897a 0.8714a 0.5411a 1.2130a 0.5792a 0.2296c 
SE 0.1164 0.1183 0.1230 0.1031 0.1060 0.1168 0.1111 0.1153 0.1312 
AIC 4866.94 4711.79 4394.56 4865.63 4713.43 4398.85 16902.86 16511.26 15864.87 
CETL          
β -0.4373a -0.3022a -0.2104a -0.4068a -0.2801a -0.1931a -0.3974a -0.2629a -0.1569a 
SE 0.0424 0.0371 0.0346 0.0393 0.0340 0.0316 0.0396 0.0324 0.0337 
AIC 5125.48 4966.65 4650.35 5125.60 4971.34 4663.57 17225.83 17114.84 16301.24 
CTA          
β -1.5618a -2.4716a -2.0885a -1.3537a -2.0737a -1.7839a -1.6333a -2.3980a -1.9371a 
SE 0.2933 0.3325 0.3420 0.2617 0.2903 0.3031 0.2818 0.3004 0.3151 
AIC 5546.80 5240.32 4859.45 5552.50 5253.27 4870.86 18900.08 18084.53 16885.00 
FETA          
β 21.9980a 16.2405a 12.2258a 19.737a 14.708a 11.454a 17.330a 11.251a 7.526a 
SE 1.6891 1.7580 1.9064 1.5101 1.5475 1.6837 1.572 1.598 1.753 
AIC 5028.53 4975.84 4634.43 5033.99 4976.34 4636.87 16649.44 16779.55 16034.27 
FES          
β 4.6120a 4.2092a 3.4310a 4.2783a 3.9209a 3.3885a 4.0081a 3.4730a 2.6573a 
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SE 0.5815 0.6150 0.6842 0.5280 0.5521 0.6161 0.601 0.6159 0.6763 
AIC 4907.00 4804.39 4458.37 4913.86 4812.60 4466.04 16158.28 16259.79 15558.52 
EBITDATA          
β -0.4419a -0.1463 -0.0290 -0.4109a -0.1540 -0.0349 -0.3719a -0.0523 0.0821 
SE 0.0952 0.1106 0.1293 0.0878 0.1021 0.1184 0.0987 0.1137 0.1354 
AIC 4943.13 4525.44 3924.66 4944.80 4531.46 3928.27 16900.65 15599.45 13849.46 
OPCE          
β -0.3015a -0.5390a -0.0830 -0.2527b -0.4796a -0.1038 -0.2982b -0.4521a -0.0438 
SE 0.1351 0.1428 0.1560 0.1236 0.1302 0.1389 0.1304 0.1338 0.1444 
AIC 5180.19 5010.50 4688.66 5185.94 5020.43 4698.28 17676.46 17420.71 16541.07 
NIS          
β -0.4056a -0.3281a -0.1338 -0.3923a -0.3229a -0.1613b -0.4466a -0.3397a -0.1647b 
SE 0.0759 0.0809 0.0887 0.0696 0.0732 0.0795 0.0752 0.0779 0.0841 
AIC 5130.54 5021.24 4681.91 5138.88 5032.81 4696.54 17108.88 17131.33 16317.38 
WCTA          
β -2.3753a -1.5757a -1.0011a -2.1715a -1.4630a -0.9621a -2.0940a -1.2861a -0.6302a 
SE 0.1790 0.1790 0.1188 0.1616 0.1615 0.1717 0.1738 0.1723 0.1805 
AIC 5004.96 4924.59 4641.70 5012.94 4929.73 4649.67 16388.07 16688.53 16071.58 
WCS          
β -1.1173a -0.7756a -0.4955a -1.0632a -0.7286a -0.4557a -1.1180a -0.7139a -0.3625a 
SE 0.1230 0.1185 0.1190 0.1155 0.1083 0.1089 0.1262 0.1190 0.1210 
AIC 4827.48 4722.42 4436.58 4834.08 4730.81 4450.76 15642.71 15998.45 15491.13 
CAG          
β -0.7359a -0.5442a -0.2251b -0.6653a -0.5101a -0.2557a -0.4378a -0.2648a -0.0032 
SE 0.0991 0.1015 0.0986 0.0910 0.0914 0.0883 0.0863 0.0840 0.0826 
AIC 4939.88 4600.72 4203.41 4947.41 4606.36 4208.70 17167.37 16333.60 15133.20 
SAG          
β -1.2002a -0.7332a -0.4815a -1.1010a -0.6863a -0.4584a -0.5733a -0.1759 0.1238 
SE 0.1472 0.1444 0.1465 0.1348 0.1289 0.1290 0.1312 0.1249 0.1245 
AIC 4850.35 4613.32 4226.02 4857.08 4624.41 4237.87 16259.93 15966.82 15100.79 
TTA          
β -15.279a -19.145a -14.104a -12.914a -16.382a -12.404a -9.151a -10.854a -5.7572a 
SE 2.6195 2.8173 2.7590 2.3253 2.5141 2.455 2.396 2.433 2.3351 
AIC 5364.37 5199.73 4846.44 5373.75 5214.21 4854.49 18084.87 17845.73 16942.59 
STDEBV          
β -0.1305 0.3249a 0.2026c -0.1293 0.2497b 0.1838c 0.0581 0.3164a 0.1792c 
SE 0.1211 0.1127 0.1226 0.1075 0.0984 0.1070 0.1023 0.0949 0.0972 
AIC 5536.37 5259.03 4875.63 5540.88 5267.90 4883.93 18894.16 18123.03 16986.19 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0005a -0.0007a -0.0007a -0.0005a -0.0006a -0.0007a -0.0005a -0.0007a -0.0007a 
SE 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
AIC 5116.50 4967.77 4579.99 5119.08 4972.20 4587.21 17237.08 17021.55 15996.35 
RETA          
β -0.2179a -0.0403 0.0579 -0.2123a -0.0545c 0.0342 -0.0963a 0.0828b 0.2082a 
SE 0.0285 0.0313 0.0363 0.0259 0.0285 0.0326 0.0292 0.0328 0.0377 
AIC 5276.77 5164.54 4789.04 5277.01 5173.25 4802.39 17632.39 17494.17 16569.14 
Section B: Event 2 
TLTA          
β 2.4763a 2.2925a 0.6454a 1.9131a 1.7385a 0.4722a 1.5491a 1.2181a -0.0936a 
P A G E  | 43                                                                                                                              
 
SE 0.0332 0.0340 0.0317 0.02433 0.0249 0.0254 0.0269 0.0263 0.0268 
AIC 39819.01 38592.44 39138.22 40351.88 39033.42 39367.36 169228.88 169676.96 151787.27 
CETL          
β -0.9832a -0.8333a -0.2073a -0.8996a -0.7392a -0.1744a -0.7573a -0.5932a -0.0674a 
SE 0.0175 0.0155 0.0076 0.0154 0.0135 0.0067 0.0153 0.0128 0.0071 
AIC 42936.67 40933.98 41487.03 42838.21 40938.75 41690.80 178868.12 179742.98 163152.60 
CTA          
β -1.9080a -2.2780a -0.5437a -1.5666a -1.8406a -0.4203a -1.3751a -1.5422a -0.1930a 
SE 0.0753 0.0821 0.0770 0.0626 0.0667 0.0632 0.0692 0.0689 0.0691 
AIC 50466.9 47135.76 43106.02 50713.44 47333.51 43285.52 187157.31 186678.96 166773.82 
FETA          
β 32.157a 24.0993a 8.8175a 25.545a 18.576a 6.5496a 19.732a 11.720a 0.3837 
SE 0.4632 0.4610 0.4786 0.3534 0.3537 0.3826 0.3847 0.3743 0.3990 
AIC 44019.66 43860.67 41314.35 44370.10 44184.51 41531.49 181845.91 185102.80 163025.31 
FES          
β 7.2176a 6.3882a 3.7784a 5.5920a 4.7768a 2.8066a 4.8881a 3.7060a 1.8270a 
SE 0.1558 0.1665 0.1733 0.1181 0.1252 0.1355 0.1368 0.1371 0.1472 
AIC 42745.25 40838.36 37532.89 43045.40 41128.05 37750.06 161702.51 162744.67 144887.85 
EBITDATA          
β -1.0991a -1.5416a -0.8150a -0.8326a -1.1046a -0.5830a -0.6991a -0.8538a -0.3375a 
SE 0.0233 0.0288 0.0275 0.0173 0.0200 0.0206 0.0195 0.0203 0.0221 
AIC 46126.68 39795.64 36760.93 46499.05 40255.74 37028.58 177955.61 165151.81 143739.48 
OPCE          
β -0.1529a -1.0081a -1.1616a -0.0848a -0.7633a -0.8937a -0.1837a -0.6900a -0.7763a 
SE 0.0320 0.0351 0.0374 0.0268 0.0284 0.0296 0.0269 0.0274 0.0291 
AIC 49958.13 46026.44 41098.81 50193.82 46327.37 41345.69 183139.45 182568.16 161874.04 
NIS          
β -0.5768a -1.0970a -0.7226a -0.4656a -0.8509a -0.5663a -0.5472a -0.9142a -0.5837a 
SE 0.0201 0.0237 0.0229 0.0165 0.0181 0.0181 0.0192 0.0197 0.0203 
AIC 45352.45 40878.51 38124.25 45592.83 41159.19 38350.81 164494.07 162248.50 146980.02 
WCTA          
β -3.2430a -3.1762a -0.8462a -2.6079a -2.4827a -0.6387a -2.1781a -1.8792a -0.0260 
SE 0.0490 0.0516 0.0461 0.0379 0.0391 0.0376 0.0413 0.0404 0.0403 
AIC 44180.67 41937.58 41577.89 44532.85 42262.79 41793.63 178733.60 179140.35 161417.71 
WCS          
β -1.5368a -1.4041a -0.1892a -1.3067a -1.1611a -0.1411a -0.9721a -0.7765a 0.1827a 
SE 0.0336 0.0336 0.0276 0.0282 0.0276 0.0227 0.0286 0.0270 0.0245 
AIC 41981.14 39752.62 37887.54 42170.25 39923.35 38056.91 158354.53 158024.93 142668.54 
CAG          
β -0.4236a -1.1145a -0.4648a -0.3359a -0.9067a -0.3640a -0.1901a -0.6554a -0.1948a 
SE 0.0209 0.0271 0.0240 0.0177 0.0230 0.0199 0.0170 0.0218 0.0194 
AIC 46446.14 40032.58 36510.56 46667.55 40334.54 36707.40 182447.86 161571.4 142418.85 
SAG          
β -0.4975a -0.8480a -0.3526a -0.4018a -0.6950a -0.2773a -0.0007 -0.2608a 0.0784a 
SE 0.0321 0.0351 0.0356 0.0266 0.0292 0.0291 0.0263 0.0286 0.0288 
AIC 42940.24 38469.84 34404.26 43119.91 38641.54 34566.08 163908.56 147657.20 130515.75 
TTA          
β -24.529a -46.053a -28.388a -21.440a -39.567a -25.191a -16.111a -32.700a -17.570a 
SE 0.8287 1.2150 0.9206 0.7345 1.0230 0.8199 0.7956 1.0520 0.8362 
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AIC 49823.67 45309.29 41671.94 50062.04 45472.27 41817.08 186556.15 185582.80 165637.98 
STDEBV          
β 0.1701a 0.3928a 0.3226a 0.1142a 0.2924a 0.2537a 0.2214a 0.3352a 0.3159a 
SE 0.0299 0.0312 0.0329 0.0250 0.0252 0.0261 0.0248 0.0243 0.0261 
AIC 50832.49 47532.22 42826.97 51068.9 47749.17 43001.94 186510.11 185977.43 165771.45 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0007a -0.0020a -0.0014a -0.0006a -0.0016a -0.0013a -0.0008a -0.0021a -0.0014a 
SE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.00004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
AIC 49315.06 45838.27 41007.13 49550 46036.04 41161.93 184043.20 185078.73 162333.72 
RETA          
β -0.4932a -0.4340a -0.1911a -0.3929a -0.3403a -0.1501a -0.2244a -0.1383a 0.0965a 
SE 0.0078 0.0079 0.0077 0.0059 0.0061 0.0062 0.0068 0.0068 0.0072 
AIC 45778.64 44205.43 42160.60 46152.58 44510.55 42364.95 185095.29 185404.33 165212.43 
          
Section C: Event 3 
TLTA          
β 2.2613a 2.2702a 1.7594a 2.0836a 2.0658a 1.6174a 1.9450a 1.7950a 1.0670a 
SE 0.2104 0.2194 0.2057 0.1874 0.1927 0.1835 0.2118 0.2594 0.2529 
AIC 1672.94 1605.55 1607.53 1678.16 1606.31 1612.21 8793.33 11036.43 11439.28 
CETL          
β -0.8100a -1.3677a -1.0503a -0.7819a -1.2917a -0.9926a -0.5795a -1.1940a -0.8392a 
SE 0.1256 0.1756 0.1501 0.1204 0.1596 0.1352 0.1162 0.1653 0.1334 
AIC 1807.22 1713.77 1705.97 1812.53 1715.99 1709.98 11896.03 8558.01 8911.28 
CTA          
β -1.2774b -2.7134a -3.1083a -1.0860b -2.3802a -2.7352a -1.3870a -2.8200a -2.7380a 
SE 0.4999 0.5819 0.6234 0.4575 0.5207 0.5522 0.5584 0.6180 0.6329 
AIC 1956.25 1879.62 1829.70 1964.16 1889.12 1839.38 13023.02 12597.72 12360.73 
FETA          
β 24.262a 29.334a 28.935a 21.696a 27.067a 26.671a 20.470a 24.470a 21.970a 
SE 2.8578 3.0460 3.2041 2.5710 2.7135 2.8383 3.0910 3.2460 3.3690 
AIC 1782.76 1768.11 1734.50 1792.13 1772.51 1737.39 11905.15 11712.32 11686.16 
FES          
β 5.9683a 5.9914a 6.2774a 5.6128a 5.5103a 5.8787a 5.8460a 5.7780a 5.9680a 
SE 0.9425 0.9578 1.0459 0.8731 0.8526 0.9317 1.2450 1.2390 1.2920 
AIC 1683.05 1720.33 1663.62 1688.37 1726.73 1670.39 11989.54 12111.67 11787.72 
EBITDATA          
β -0.6521a -0.7622a -0.8135a -0.6212a -0.6576a -0.7441a -0.4909a -0.4434a -0.7848a 
SE 0.1534 0.1749 0.1794 0.1428 0.1497 0.1628 0.1799 0.1988 0.2319 
AIC 1719.03 1598.20 1437.74 1724.62 1599.91 1444.79 12248.42 11576.53 10713.39 
OPCE          
β 0.4351c -0.0031 -0.5827b 0.4065c -0.0273 -0.5849a 0.2023 -0.0342 -0.6290c 
SE 0.2456 0.2434 0.2499 0.2257 0.2239 0.2246 0.2418 0.2353 0.2484 
AIC 1842.11 1840.29 1798.55 1848.99 1848.20 1807.13 12810.22 12672.58 12406.50 
NIS          
β -0.1690 -0.5182a -0.6758a -0.1570 -0.4651a -0.6240a -0.2152 -0.5197a -0.7127a 
SE 0.1341 0.1321 0.1387 0.1235 0.1172 0.1219 0.1566 0.1499 0.1585 
AIC 1748.85 1759.28 1689.10 1757.05 1766.78 1697.26 12644.75 12542.26 12144.18 
WCTA          
β -2.9201a -3.4000a -2.8521a -2.7048a -3.1075a -2.6474a -2.1300a -2.5091a -1.6840a 
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SE 0.3286 0.3533 0.3375 0.2987 0.3107 0.3000 0.3571 0.3645 0.3442 
AIC 1745.31 1701.38 1700.15 1751.42 1706.69 1705.59 12114.67 11805.99 11934.96 
WCS          
β -1.8870a -1.8229a -1.6438a -1.7958a -1.7241a -1.5782a -1.5530a -1.3580a -1.0540a 
SE 0.2770 0.2724 0.2729 0.2609 0.2501 0.2482 0.2890 0.2652 0.2595 
AIC 1638.45 1658.85 1613.76 1643.09 1664.47 1620.71 11665.17 11757.54 11502.82 
CAG          
β -0.2799c -0.5790a -1.2346a -0.2719b -0.5426a -1.1636a -0.0643 -0.2673c -0.7301a 
SE 0.1512 0.1731 0.2203 0.1390 0.1586 0.2026 0.1342 0.1440 0.1791 
AIC 1830.94 1775.43 1610.59 1838.31 1783.90 1616.51 12647.23 12316.50 11161.17 
SAG          
β -1.1656a -1.6190a -1.7849a -1.1151a -1.4808a -1.4904a -0.5766b -0.9741a -0.7436a 
SE 0.2665 0.2951 0.3119 0.2478 0.2693 0.2711 0.2661 0.2680 0.2664 
AIC 1719.37 1666.91 1556.88 1725.12 1675.49 1566.20 12345.43 11927.15 11210.35 
TTA          
β -20.974a -20.448a -48.177a -17.538a -17.843a -42.345a -17.620a -16.050a -45.040a 
SE 5.5795 5.5359 8.4749 4.8925 4.9486 7.4022 5.6440 5.4830 9.1990 
AIC 1890.55 1877.57 1799.09 1898.95 1886.24 1808.33 12943.40 12792.58 12340.86 
STDEBV          
β -1.7364a -0.0330 0.5541a -1.5598a -0.0460 0.5348a -0.8312a 0.0242 0.4216b 
SE 0.3239 0.1968 0.1824 0.3018 0.1769 0.1596 0.2529 0.1814 0.1770 
AIC 1901.23 1897.58 1846.94 1908.93 1905.26 1854.31 12948.38 12805.56 12503.92 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0009b -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0008b -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009b 
SE 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
AIC 1827.81 1851.02 1791.41 1833.82 1858.40 1799.65 12565.97 12561.62 12210.71 
RETA          
β -0.4576a -0.3484a -0.2025a -0.4209a -0.3201a -0.1846a -0.2789a -0.1585a 0.0303 
SE 0.0511 0.0484 0.0493 0.0453 0.0431 0.0441 0.0598 0.0596 0.0627 
AIC 1788.77 1813.79 1811.38 1793.14 1819.79 1820.26 12422.61 12528.49 12529.59 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports univariate regression 
estimates of Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 using respective hazard models and lagged time periods. Section A 
reports regression estimates of Event 1, Section B reports Event 2, and Section C reports Event 3. 
 
 
Table 9: Multivariate Regression  
Section A: Event 1 
Variable 
logit clog-log Cox 
T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 T – 1 T – 2 T – 3 
STDEBV          
β  0.3008b   0.2010c   0.3709a  
SE  0.1295   0.1201   0.0884  
p-value  0.0200   0.0940   0.0000  
TLTA          
β 0.9948a   0.8597a   0.7369a   
SE 0.2226   0.1913   0.1384   
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p-value 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
CETL          
β -0.2530a   -0.2388a   -0.2259a   
SE 0.0700   0.0618   0.0448   
p-value 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
CTA          
β -0.3425  -2.2829a -0.2665  -1.9289a -0.2804  -1.7416a 
SE 0.4572  0.4935 0.3970  0.4305 0.2786  0.2893 
p-value 0.2440  0.0000 0.2320  0.0000 0.2100  0.0000 
FETA          
β 7.3617a 12.369a 6.1982b 6.0372a 11.740a 6.4750a 3.0878a 9.1737a 5.5547a 
SE 2.7061 2.3270 2.5504 2.3321 2.2416 2.2326 1.8124 1.6206 1.5421 
p-value 0.0070 0.0000 0.0150 0.0100 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 
FES          
β          
SE          
p-value          
EBITDAIE          
β  -0.0005b -0.0006a  -0.0005b -0.0006a  -0.0003b -0.0005a 
SE  0.0002 0.0002  0.0002 0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 
p-value  0.0200 0.0090  0.0120 0.0090  0.0420 0.0019 
EBITDATA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
OPCE          
β -0.5270a -0.2243  -0.4234a -0.2546  -0.2847b -0.1002  
SE 0.1812 0.1809  0.1550 0.1697  0.1185 0.1277  
p-value 0.0040 0.2150  0.0060 0.1340  0.0160 0.2300  
NIS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
RETA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
          
WCTA          
β  -0.5958b   -0.6578a   -0.5090a  
SE  0.2543   0.2462   0.1748  
p-value  0.0190   0.0080   0.0036  
WCS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
CAG          
β -0.2328c -0.1335  -0.2025c -0.1082  -0.3474a -0.2175b  
SE 0.1206 0.1120  0.1063 0.1039  0.0913 0.0862  
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p-value 0.0540 0.2330  0.0570 0.2480  0.0000 0.0120  
SAG          
β -0.5326a -0.2226 -0.2023 -0.4826a -0.1808 -0.2368c -0.8411a -0.4764a -0.2778b 
-SE 0.1748 0.1528 0.1643 0.1551 0.1438 0.1415 0.1351 0.1200 0.1155 
p-value 0.0020 0.1450 0.2180 0.0020 0.2090 0.0940 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 
TTA          
β -4.1461 -10.394a -10.428a -3.4981 -9.5294a -8.9473a -1.1812 -7.6240a -7.0481a 
SE 3.5669 3.6154 3.5802 3.1214 3.3587 3.0952 2.4601 2.5793 2.3600 
p-value 0.2450 0.0040 0.0040 0.2420 0.0050 0.0040 0.6300 0.0031 0.0000 
Micro          
β 2.0176a 1.9982a 2.5646a 1.7140a 2.0089a 2.2413a 0.7910a 1.1579a 1.5554a 
SE 0.2419 0.2119 0.2412 0.2078 0.2038 0.2116 0.1295 0.1254 0.1257 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Small          
β 0.7552a 0.8696a 1.2075a 0.6548a 0.8792a 1.0438a 0.1142 0.3240a 0.5422a 
SE 0.2064 0.1899 0.2060 0.1829 0.1802 0.1861 0.1266 0.1225 0.1275 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3700 0.0084 0.0000 
AGE          
 0.4964a 0.5408a 0.7246a 0.3949a 0.5447a 0.6130a -33.253a -36.575a -43.231a 
β 0.1452 0.1451 0.1835 0.1266 0.1435 0.1631 1.0312 1.2182 1.2320 
SE 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value          
RISK1 90.495a 77.879a 91.854a 77.607a 78.677a 78.7463a 46.871a 44.689a 43.998a 
β 7.3345 6.1372 7.3431 6.2999 6.1021 6.4905 3.0780 2.9346 3.3759 
SE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value          
Model’s Goodness of Fit and Performance Measure 
Chi2 403.06a 321.8a 311.8a 411.2a 377.8a 311.9a 2785a 2874a 3222a 
 likelihood -1746.9 -1837.2 -1791.8 -1748.6 -1838.5 -1790.4 -3051.2 -3291.5 -3283.1 
AIC 3521.9 3702.3 3605.6 3525.3 3705.1 3602.9 6294.5 6753.4 7237.08 
N 46927 44400 40882 46927 44400 40882 46927 44400 40882 
Event 433 464 469 433 464 469 433 464 469 
AUROC-W 0.8209 0.7936 0.7827 0.8212 0.7929 0.7831 0.8192 0.7912 0.7797 
AUROC-H 0.7943 0.8339 0.9242 0.7890 0.8937 0.9233 0.7572 0.8784 0.9112 
Section B: Event 2 
STDEBV          
β 0.1743a 0.2511a 0.2533a 0.1544a 0.2151a 0.1998a 0.2003a 0.2046a 0.1974a 
SE 0.0388 0.0453 0.0456 0.0290 0.0328 0.0348 0.0233 0.0249 0.0290 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TLTA          
β 1.9886a 2.2478a 0.3296a 1.4622a 1.5668a 0.2143a 1.1641a 1.1266a 0.4912a 
SE 0.0654 0.0777 0.0723 0.0481 0.0548 0.0549 0.0347 0.0370 0.0418 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CETL          
β          
SE          
p-value          
CTA          
β  -1.3447a   -0.9909a   -0.5477a  
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SE  0.1462   0.1082   0.0769  
p-value  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
FETA          
β 15.786a 2.6571a 3.3366a 11.798a 2.1859a 2.6998a 8.6179a 3.6960a 4.5587a 
SE 0.7083 0.9955 0.9549 0.5354 0.7093 0.7338 0.4185 0.5306 0.6053 
p-value 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FES          
β  0.3141 0.8577a  0.0920 0.5806a  -0.3210b 0.1233 
SE  0.2911 0.2675  0.2110 0.2061  0.1461 0.1607 
p-value  0.2410 0.0010  0.6630 0.0050  0.0280 0.4400 
EBITDAIE          
β -0.0003a -0.0004a -0.0006a -0.0004a -0.0004a -0.0006a -0.0005a -0.0004a -0.0006a 
SE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
p-value 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EBITDATA          
β -0.1624a -0.7619a -0.3114a -0.0850a -0.5110a -0.2281a -0.0860a -0.3205a -0.1783a 
SE 0.0380 0.0467 0.0422 0.0264 0.0312 0.0312 0.0177 0.0205 0.0236 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
OPCE          
β -0.9026a -1.4723a -0.8999a -0.6398a -1.0036a -0.6650a -0.5802a -0.7744a -0.6558a 
SE 0.0471 0.0580 0.0538 0.0336 0.0395 0.0409 0.0260 0.0289 0.0341 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NIS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
RETA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
WCTA          
β -0.5875a -0.2946a -0.1058 -0.5189a -0.3310a -0.1064 -0.3858a -0.2745a -0.0722 
SE 0.0881 0.1130 0.0948 0.0668 0.0832 0.0733 0.0501 0.0595 0.0566 
p-value 0.0000 0.0090 0.2440 0.0000 0.0000 0.1470 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 
WCS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
CAG          
β  -0.7094a -0.1534a  -0.4575a -0.1116a  -0.4140a -0.1096a 
SE  0.0373 0.0300  0.0278 0.0240  0.0239 0.0221 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
SAG          
β -0.0569 -0.3881a  -0.0652b -0.2993a  -0.1152a -0.2601a  
SE 0.0395 0.0461  0.0300 0.0342  0.0252 0.0284  
p-value 0.1500 0.0000  0.0300 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
TTA          
β -11.374a -28.651a -14.413a -10.596a -25.191a -13.489a -11.846a -24.508a -14.586a 
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SE 1.0783 1.5922 1.1580 0.9030 1.3307 1.0279 0.7909 1.0302 0.9033 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Micro          
β 0.4154a 0.5147a 1.0577a 0.2928a 0.3762a 0.8451a 0.1853a 0.2582a 0.6144a 
SE 0.0662 0.0742 0.0683 0.0504 0.0556 0.0536 0.0342 0.0366 0.0377 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Small          
β 0.2786a 0.3265a 0.6749a 0.2094a 0.2675a 0.5466a 0.1471a 0.1845a 0.4122a 
SE 0.0488 0.0551 0.0521 0.0381 0.0423 0.0421 0.0279 0.0301 0.0316 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AGE          
β -0.0285 -0.1323a -0.0029 -0.0732a -0.1535a -0.0137 -24.865a -27.661a -33.798a 
SE 0.0353 0.0445 0.0453 0.0277 0.0343 0.0366 0.2734 0.3437 0.4217 
p-value 0.4190 0.0030 0.9490 0.0080 0.0000 0.7090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RISK2          
β 5.4673a 4.0201a 6.5065a 4.1230a 3.2239a 5.2226a 2.4035a 1.7983a 3.3036a 
SE 0.4117 0.4662 0.4423 0.3152 0.3513 0.3475 0.2266 0.2531 0.2688 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Model’s Goodness of Fit and Performance Measure 
Chi2 5135.9a 4381.9a 2228.2a 5818.2a 5039.8a 2307.3a 42073a 37046a 29048a 
 likelihood -13550.1 -10534.2 -12115.9 -13807.9 -10862.8 -12225.9 -52703.6 -42792.4 -39919.4 
AIC 27130.1 21104.3 24263.6 27645.9 21761.6 24483.8 105433.1 85616.7 79866.8 
N 44740 36907 33396 44740 36907 33396 44740 36907 33396 
Event 7553 6390 5721 7553 6390 5721 7553 6390 5721 
AUROC-W 0.8739 0.9015 0.7794 0.8721 0.8991 0.7767 0.8699 0.8969 0.7865 
AUROC-H 0.8436 0.8714 0.7783 0.8425 0.8686 0.7745 0.8414 0.8705 0.7803 
Section C: Event 3 
STDEBV          
β  0.4912c 0.6417b  0.4266c 0.4680c  0.6404a 0.6278a 
SE  0.2715 0.2861  0.2250 0.2401  0.1721 0.1593 
p-value  0.0700 0.0250  0.0580 0.0510  0.0000 0.0000 
TLTA          
β  1.7594a 1.5434a  1.6420a 1.3451a  1.4437a 1.0166a 
SE  0.4712 0.4767  0.3943 0.4140  0.2787 0.2551 
p-value  0.0000 0.0010  0.0000 0.0010  0.0000 0.0000 
CETL          
β -0.4543a   -0.4430a   -1.0176a   
SE 0.1747   0.1682   0.1237   
p-value 0.0090   0.0080   0.0000   
CTA          
β   -1.3311   -1.0743   -0.9048 
SE   1.1703   1.0090   0.6390 
p-value   0.2450   0.2870   0.1600 
FETA          
β 12.022a 16.656a 15.631a 9.5936a 13.686a 14.313a 5.7686b 10.272a 7.3060b 
SE 4.1089 4.9550 5.7427 3.5011 4.1907 4.9884 2.8568 3.3580 3.5285 
p-value 0.0030 0.0010 0.0060 0.0060 0.0010 0.0040 0.0440 0.0000 0.0380 
FES          
β          
P A G E  | 50                                                                                                                              
 
SE          
p-value          
EBITDAIE          
β          
SE          
p-value          
EBITDATA          
β          
SE          
p-value          
OPCE          
β  -0.4816 -0.3651  -0.4501 -0.2209  -0.5053b -0.3928c 
SE  0.3382 0.3815  0.2829 0.3328  0.2123 0.2202 
p-value  0.1540 0.2390  0.1120 0.5070  0.0170 0.0750 
NIS          
β          
SE          
p-value          
RETA          
β -0.2000a   -0.1957a   0.0104   
SE 0.0751   0.0659   0.0451   
p-value 0.0080   0.0030   0.8199   
WCTA          
β -0.6195 -0.8440  -0.5472 -0.5571  0.0368 -0.4660  
SE 0.5165 0.6515  0.4475 0.5384  0.3657 0.4109  
p-value 0.2300 0.1950  0.2210 0.3010  0.9200 0.2600  
WCS          
β   -0.4132   -0.3643   -0.2302 
SE   0.4486   0.3830   0.2504 
p-value   0.2470   0.3410   0.3600 
CAG          
β   -0.5432b   -0.4291c   -0.4133b 
SE   0.2587   0.2286   0.1692 
p-value   0.0360   0.0610   0.0150 
SAG          
β -0.2695 -0.7311b -0.8411b -0.1909 -0.6557b -0.7206b -0.7072a -1.0009a -0.6980a 
SE 0.2873 0.3311 0.3575 0.2571 0.2863 0.3126 0.2307 0.2441 0.2369 
p-value 0.2480 0.0270 0.0190 0.4580 0.0220 0.0210 0.0022 0.0004 0.0032 
TTA          
β -15.152c -3.948 -36.756a -14.043c -3.288 -30.773a -12.173b -3.463 -21.901a 
SE 8.458 8.164 11.596 7.407 6.970 10.121 5.458 5.151 7.195 
p-value 0.0730 0.6290 0.0020 0.0580 0.6370 0.0020 0.0260 0.5000 0.0023 
Micro          
β 1.9486a 2.4476a 2.7400a 1.6619a 1.9905a 2.2511a 1.3615a 1.3692a 1.5166a 
SE 0.4272 0.4541 0.4979 0.3718 0.3700 0.4144 0.2614 0.2485 0.2334 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Small          
β 0.4747 0.4216 0.6411 0.3976 0.3934 0.5285 0.4086c 0.2318 0.2639 
SE 0.3809 0.4366 0.4742 0.3376 0.3681 0.4114 0.2418 0.2565 0.2572 
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p-value 0.2130 0.2340 0.1760 0.2390 0.2850 0.1990 0.0910 0.3700 0.3000 
AGE          
β 0.9837a 0.7653b 0.4242 0.8869a 0.6001b 0.3010 -42.888a -47.477a -35.227a 
SE 0.2714 0.3363 0.3910 0.2386 0.2799 0.3439 2.4175 2.0754 3.2681 
p-value 0.0000 0.0230 0.2480 0.0000 0.0320 0.3810 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RISK3          
β 219.806a 226.564a 239.428a 204.698a 189.601a 211.302a 94.989a 87.859a 79.818a 
SE 22.477 24.405 29.131 16.901 17.913 21.444 11.357 11.824 10.728 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Model’s Goodness of Fit and Performance Measure 
Chi2 170.1a 155.2a 132.6a 236.5a 202.6a 167.3a 1149a 1112a 1084a 
 likelihood -657.02 -590.5 -529.3 -660.6 -592.1 -530.7 -938.6 -881.6 -808.5 
AIC 1338.1 1207.1 1088.6 1345.2 1210.3 1091.4 2117.9 2048.1 1808.8 
Censored 50126 40639 35327 50126 40639 35327 50126 40639 35327 
Event 143 136 131 143 136 131 143 136 131 
AUROC-W 0.8840 0.9019 0.9020 0.8840 0.9031 0.9015 0.8783 0.8955 0.8964 
AUROC-H 0.9249 0.8924 0.9668 0.9317 0.9019 0.9214 0.9447 0.8653 0.9556 
Notes: a (b) [c] significant at the 1 % (5 %) [10 %] level (two-sided test). This table reports multivariate 
regression estimates of Event 1, Event 2 and Event 3 using respective hazard models and lagged time periods. 
Section A reports regression estimates of Event 1, Section B reports Event 2, and Section C reports Event 3. The 
Chi2 values reported for logit and cloglog estimates are obtained using the Wald test, while for Cox regression it 
is obtained using likelihood ratio test. AUROC-W represents within sample and AUROC-H represents hold-out 
sample area under ROC curves. ‘Event’ reports total number of observations with dependent variable = 1 and 
‘censored’ reports total number of observations with dependent variable = 0. Additionally, missing values of β, 
SE and p-value for any covariate implies that it has been excluded from the multivariate model due to its non-
compliance with our model building strategy discussed in Section 5.3.2.  
  
 
 
Figure 1: Table of Hazard Curves 
 
Notes: This table reports smoothed hazard curves estimated using the development sample for different definitions of 
financial distress events as discussed in Section 3. Here ‘Age’ represents the age of firms in years. 
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Figure 2: Table of Area under ROC curves 
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